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IV.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The statutory authority conferring jurisdiction on the Utah
Supreme Court to decide this appeal is Utah Code Ann. § 78-22(3)(j).
V.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

After the Utah Supreme Court ruled that the depositors

could bring their claims alleging gross negligence against Brimhall
and Borthick did the lower court commit reversible error in
granting Borthick1s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings by ruling
that he had no duty to the depositors?
2.

May the lower court dismiss the depositors' claims on the

basis of a statute of limitations, after the Utah Supreme Court
ruled that no statute of limitations bars the depositors' claims?
3.

Did the lower court commit reversible error in failing to

apply the U.R.C.P.

23 criteria when

it denied

class action

certification to this litigation?
4.

Did the lower court commit reversible error in failing to

state any reason for denying class action certification to this
litigation?
The standard of review for each issue follows:

All issues

raised from the appeal of the adverse summary judgment are issues
of law with no deference to the trial court.
1

Feree v. State, 784

P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1989).
a question of law.

Specifically, whether a duty exists is

Id. at 1189; Weber by and through Weber v.

Sprinqville. 725 P.2d 1360, 1363 (Utah 1986); but see, Beach v.
University of Utah. 726 P.2d 413, 416 (1986).
Whether a statute of
question of law.

limitations bars a claim

is also a

e.g., Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 246 (Utah

1988); Beck v. Dutchman Coal Mines Co.. 269 P.2d 867 (Utah 1959).
The question of whether the lower court failed to apply or
misapplied Rule 23 is also a question of law.

See, Call v. West

Jordan. 727 P.2d 180, 183 (Utah 1986).
VI.
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES.
ORDINANCES. RULES AND REGULATIONS
Citations

for

determinative

constitutional

provisions,

statutes, ordinances, rules and regulations follow:
Utah Code Ann. §§ 7-1-1, 7-1-3, 7-1-7, 7-1-8, 7-1-13, 7-1-14, 7-117, 7-1-18, 7-1-26, 7-1-27, 7-1-102, 7-1-301, 7-2-1, 7-10-1, 63-304, 70B-1-102, 70B-3-503, 70B-3-504, 70B-3-506, 70B-6-103, 70B-6104, 70B-6-10, 70B-6-110, 78-2-2(3)(j), 78-12-25, 78-12-26, 78-1228, 78-12-29.
They are set out verbatim in the addendum to this brief.

2

VII.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from three orders of the Third Judicial
District Court, the Honorable Pat B. Brian presiding:
A.

An order granting summary judgment to former Commissioner
of the Department of Financial Institutions, W. Smoot
Brimhall ("Brimhall").

The court ruled that the statute

of limitations bars the depositors1 claims against him.
B.

An order granting former Commissioner of the Department
of

Financial

Institutions,

Mirvin

D.

Borthick's

("Borthick") Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. The
court ruled that the commissioners had no duty to the
depositors and that the claims were barred by common law
good faith immunity.
C.

An order denying class action certification to the
depositors1 litigation.
VIII.
STATEMENT OF FACTS RELEVANT TO THE ISSUES
PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

A motion for judgment on the pleadings must be based on the
undisputed facts as they appear in the pleadings.

All material

allegations in the pleadings by the opposing party are accepted as
true.

All contested factual issues are resolved in favor of the

opposing party.

e.g., Noel v. Olds, 149 F.2d 13 (D.C.App. 1945);
3

Rosenhan v. U.S., 131 F.2d 932 (10th Cir. 1942).
court

received

depositors.

matters
As

to

outside

the

of

the

depositors'

In addition, the

pleadings

evidentiary

from

the

materials,

Borthick's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is treated in the
same fashion as Brimhall's Motion for Summary Judgment.

U.R.C.P.

12(c) . That is, on appeal, the party against whom the judgment has
been granted is entitled to have all the facts presented and all
the inferences fairly arising therefrom considered in a light most
favorable to him.
(Utah 1964).

e.g., Whitman v. W.T. Grant Co., 395 P.2d 918

In light of the foregoing principals, the facts

relevant to the issues presented for review, are as follows:
The appellants are 11 depositors who lost their savings in
Grove Finance Company ("Grove Finance").

The respondents are the

former Commissioners of the Utah Department of Financial Institutions ("Department").

Brimhall was commissioner from 1965 to

1979 and Borthick served as Brimhall's successor from 1979 to
November of 1981.

(R.2-8, 34-51.)

Grove Finance was licensed by the Department as a small loan
business (Utah Code Ann. § 7-10-1 et seq.) and beginning in 1970
transacted a banking business by receiving money on deposit.
(R.3,6, 557).
In 1969, the Utah legislature passed the Utah Uniform Consumer
Credit Code (Title 70B). Thereafter, commissioners Brimhall and
Borthick determined that Grove Finance should be licensed as a
4

supervised lender. (R. 557.) Supervised lenders are authorized to
make loans but they are not authorized to receive deposits.

The

commissioners knew, or should have known, that Grove Finance was
accepting deposits and transacting a banking business contrary to
Tile 7 and 70B. (R. 558-60).

(Gary Cox depo. pp. 41, 57; Frank

Stuart depo. p. 3 3.) That is, Grove Finance sold debentures to the
public.

The debentures were set up in such a way that they were

nothing more than accounts on deposit.

(R. 557, 591, 592.)

A

sample deposit account ledger is attached in the addendum.
Title 7 and Title 70B of the Utah Code imposed specific duties
upon the commissioners to examine, investigate and supervise Grove
Finance.

The defendant commissioners failed in these statutory

duties with respect to Grove Finance as follows:
a)

They did not conduct the annual examinations required by
Utah Code Ann. § 7-1-8;

b)

They did not annually determine whether Grove Finance was
violating the law as required by Utah Code Ann. § 7-1-14;

c)

They did not receive and publish the financial reports
described in Utah Code Ann. § 7-1-17;

d)

They did not call for the special financial

reports

necessary for the protection of the public as set forth
in Utah Code Ann. § 7-1-18;
e)

They did not timely revoke Grove Finance's Articles of
Incorporation as set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 7-1-26;

5

f)

They did not timely take possession of Grove Finance's
banking business even though the commissioners knew the
banking business was unauthorized and unsafe. Utah Code
Ann. § 7-2-1; and

g)

They did not periodically examine the loans, business and
records of Grove Finance as required by Utah Code Ann. §
70B-3-506(l).

(R. 3, 4, 5, 6, 557, 559-60, 570-71.)
In addition, the Commissioners did not require any employee,
training or procedures manuals.

The commissioners totally failed

to implement any procedure that would assure that the statutory
duties would be timely and adequately performed.

(R. 7, 557, 558.)

The depositors reasonably relied on the commissioners to
perform their statutory responsibilities.

(R. 5.)

After several years of Grove Finance conducting an illegal
banking business, Borthick, in response to a March 1980 telephone
complaint, sent Gary R. Cox to examine Grove Finance.

(R. 558;

Borthick depo. p. 95; Cox depo. p. 38.) Cox examined the debenture
records of Grove Finance.

The debenture records had never before

been examined by the commissioners.

Cox's three hours of examin-

ation disclosed that Grove Finance had $8 million in debentures and
only $2 million in loans.

"It became very obvious that there was

a problem . . . that liabilities exceeded assets.
asset, a debenture is a liability."
6

A loan is an

(R. 558; Cox depo. p. 46.)

However, Borthick did not immediately
problem.
order

He waited over a month before issuing a cease and desist

requiring

business.

act on the obvious

Grove

Finance

to

stop

its

debenture

deposit

(R. 7, 558, 591.)

Grove Finance ignored the cease and desist order and continued
to

sell

debentures

and

accept

deposits.

(R.

7,

558.)

The

appellants continued to buy debentures and place their money on
deposit with Grove Finance.

(R. 559; Borthick depo. p. 104; Cox

depo. pp. 71-72.)
Three months after Borthick knew that Grove Finance's liabilities were four times its assets, Borthick belatedly closed Grove
Finance.

(R. 559.)

Grove Finance filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy.

These depositors lost the following amounts:
Richard and Nancy Madsen
Boyd and Beatrice Swensen
Blaine and Sheree Anderson
Hope Hilton
Cynthia Hilton
Ralph M. Hilton
The Middle East Foundation

$25,770.00
14,459.00
4,199.05
6,000.09
13,838.44
1,900.37
$ 7,930.81

(R. 7, 559-60; Plaintiff Supplemental Answers to Interrogatory No.
12, April 5, 1990.)
The depositors sued the State of Utah and the Commissioners
in March of 1981.

The district court dismissed the complaint.

In

Madsen v. Borthick, 658 P.2d 627 (Utah 1983) (hereinafter "Madsen
X,f) , the Utah Supreme Court upheld the dismissal and ruled that the
defendants were immune from suit in their official capacity and
could only be sued in their personal capacity for gross negligence.
7

Subsequently, the named depositors, on behalf of themselves
and all other 1250 similarly situated depositors, filed this action
against the former commissioners alleging gross negligence.
8.)

(R 2-

The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the

defendants.

The ruling was reversed by the Utah Supreme Court in

Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245 (Utah 1989) (hereinafter "Madsen
II11) .

Specifically, the Utah

Supreme Court ruled

that the

depositors1 claims against Brimhall and Borthick are not barred by
any statute of limitations nor governmental immunity.
Brimhall petitioned this Court for a rehearing, and alleged
that the statute of limitations barred the depositors1 claims
against him.

This court denied the petition for rehearing and

remanded the case to the district court.

(A copy of the Petition

and Order are set forth in the Addendum.)

On remand, the district

court, contrary to the Madsen II opinion, granted Brimhall a
summary judgment by ruling that the statute of limitations barred
the depositors' claims.

(R. 499-500.)

Subsequently, the district court refused to certify this
action as a class action even though the defendants did not contest
that the Rule 23 requirements of numerosity, commonality, typicality, superiority and adequate representation are all present in
this litigation.

(R. 277-291, 300-305, 401, 402, 407-412, 458-463,

413,416, 468-488, 499-500.)
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Thereafter, Borthick filed a Motion for Judgment on the
Pleadings.
was grossly

For purposes of the motion, Borthick admitted that he
negligent

depositors' complaint

in performing
but

said

the duties pled

that he had

in the

no duty to the

depositors and that his errors were protected by common law good
faith immunity.

Contrary to Madsen II, the trial court ruled that

the former commissioner had no duty to the depositors and granted
the motion. (R. 55, 509-524, 554-602, 613-623, 640-642.)
The depositors timely appealed (R. 653-658.)
IX.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
POINT I
THIS COURT IN MADSEN II, RULED THAT NO
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS BARS THE
DEPOSITORS' CLAIMS AGAINST BRIMHALL
The Utah Supreme Court ruled in this litigation that no
statute

of

limitations

bars

the

depositors'

claims

against

Brimhall. Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 254 (Utah 1988). This
express ruling is the law of the case and is binding upon the
parties, the trial court and this court.
POINT II
THE STATUTES OF LIMITATION, ADVOCATED BY BRIMHALL,
DO NOT BAR THE DEPOSITORS1 CLAIMS AGAINST HIM
The statutes of limitation advocated by Brimhall do not bar
the depositors' claims because: (1) the statutes do not apply to
9

the depositors1 claims; (2) the Complaint filed against Brimhall
relates back to the Complaint filed against Borthick; and (3) any
applicable statute of limitations did not begin to run until the
depositors suffered damages.
POINT III
THE COMMISSIONERS HAD A DUTY TO EXAMINE, INVESTIGATE
AND SUPERVISE GROVE FINANCE, A SUPERVISED LENDER
ENGAGED IN THE BANKING BUSINESS
Title 7 and Title 70B of the Utah Code impose specific,
mandatory

and comprehensive duties upon the commissioners to

examine, investigate and supervise Grove Finance.

Utah Code Ann.

§§ 7-1-7, 7-1-13, 7-1-14, 7-1-18, 7-1-27, 7-1-26, 7-10-7, 7-2-1
(1979); Utah Code Ann. §§ 70B-6-103, 70B-3-506(1), 70B-3-503(2),
70B-3-504, 70B-6-104(5), 70B-6-109, 70B-6-110 (1953, as amended).
POINT IV
THE STATUTORY DUTIES RUN TO THE DEPOSITORS
The commissioners1 duties to examine, investigate and supervise Grove Finance, run to the depositors because: (1) Grove Fiance
was under the supervision of the commissioners; (2) Grove Finance
was licensed by the commissioners; and (3) The depositors are a
group targeted for protection by Utah's statutory banking laws.

10

POINT V
THE COMMISSIONERS CAN BE SUED PERSONALLY FOR GOVERNMENTAL ACTIONS WHEN THEY ARE GROSSLY NEGLIGENT
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-4 (Supp. 1979) as construed by Madsen
II provides that these depositors can sue for the gross negligence
committed by the commissioners.

To apply a kind of "duty to all,

duty to no one" doctrine contradicts both the legislative and
judicial determinations that the depositors can sue the commissioners personally for gross negligence.
POINT VI
ANY ALLEGED GOOD-FAITH OF THE COMMISSIONERS
DOES NOT BAR THE DEPOSITORS' CLAIMS
The common law defense of good faith qualified immunity does
not bar the depositors1 claims because the defense is contrary to
the Utah Governmental Immunity Act.

Further, the duties imposed

upon the commissioners were mandatory not discretionary.
POINT VII
WHETHER THE COMMISSIONERS PERFORMED THEIR STATUTORY DUTIES
HONESTLY AND IN GOOD FAITH ARE QUESTIONS OF FACT
PRECLUDING A MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS
The common law good faith defense only applies if: (1) duties
are performed; (2) honestly; and (3) in good faith.
elements is a question of fact requiring a trial.
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Each of these

POINT VIII
RES JUDICATA PRECLUDES THE COMMISSIONERS FROM
RAISING THE "DUTY TO ALL. DUTY TO NO ONE" DEFENSE
The "duty to all, duty to no one" doctrine is an affirmative
defense which could and should have been raised in Madsen I.

Res

judicata bars the commissioners from raising the defense in this
litigation.
POINT IX
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN FAILING
TO CERTIFY THIS LITIGATION AS A CLASS ACTION
The district court in denying class action certification,
committed reversible error in failing to apply the criteria set
forth in U.R.C.P. 23 and applying factors other than those set
forth in U.R.C.P. 23, Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156
(1974) .
POINT X
THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR
WHEN IT FAILED TO STATE ANY REASON
FOR DENYING CLASS ACTION CERTIFICATION
TO THIS LITIGATION
It is reversible error not to state any reasons for denying
class action certification.

The failure to do so often makes it

impossible to discern whether the lower court applied or misapplied
Rule 23.
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X.
ARGUMENT
INTRODUCTION
The trial court granted Brimhall1s Motion for Summary Judgment
solely on the basis that the statute of limitations barred the
depositors' claims.

The depositors submit that this ruling was

contrary to the previous ruling of the Utah Supreme Court in this
very case and that no statute of limitations advocated by Brimhall
bars the depositors1 claims.
The trial court granted Borthick's Motion for Judgment on the
Pleadings by reasoning that the commissioners had no duty to the
depositors and that the common law defense of good faith immunity
bars the depositors1 claims.

The ruling must be reversed for the

following reasons:
A.

In a previous decision, this Court ruled that the depositors can sue the commissioners for gross negligence.

B.

The commissioners had a duty to examine, investigate and
supervise Grove Finance.

C.

The duty runs to the depositors.

D.

The "duty to all, duty to no one" doctrine is contrary to
the Governmental Immunity Act and Madsen II.

E.

The "duty to all, duty to no one" doctrine and common law
good faith immunity doctrine advocated by the commissioners are defenses that could and should have been
13

brought in Madsen I and/or Madsen II and are barred by
res judicata.
F.

The common law defense of good faith qualified immunity
is contrary to the Governmental Immunity Act and does not
apply to ministerial duties.

G.

Any issue of good faith involves questions of fact
precluding a motion for judgment on the pleadings.

Each of the foregoing points is briefed in this "Argument.11
POINT I
THIS COURT IN MADSEN II, RULED THAT
NO STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS BARS THE DEPOSITORS1
CLAIMS AGAINST BRIMHALL
A.

Factual Background.
This is not the first appeal in this litigation to consider

whether a statute of limitations bars the depositors1

claims

against Brimhall. In Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245 (Utah 1988)
("Madsen II"), at issue was whether any statute of limitations,
i.e., Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-26(4), 28(1) or 29(2) barred the
depositors' claims against Brimhall and Borthick. The Utah Supreme
Court ruled that they did not:
The [trial] court held . . . that the applicable statute of limitations bars this action.
The investors challenge all of these legal
conclusions. We agree with the investors that
the trial court's ruling was incorrect and
remand the matter for further proceeding.
Madsen II p. 246.
14

* * *

Finally, we consider the investors challenge
to the last ground given by the trial court in
support of the summary judgment—that the suit
was time barred by any of three potentially
applicable statutes of limitation, Section 7812-26-(4)-28(l) and 29(2) of the code. . . .
[W]e conclude that under any of them, Section
78-12-40 did extend the time for filing and
that the investors commenced this action
within the period of the extension . . . it
was not time barred.
Madsen II, pp. 253-254.
Subsequently, Brimhall petitioned the Utah Supreme Court to
reconsider the statutes of limitation issue.
for rehearing was denied.

Brimhallfs petition

(See Addendum.)

On remand, Brimhall filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. The
sole argument for the motion was that the depositors' claims were
barred either by Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-26(4), § 78-12-28(1) or §
78-12-29(8) the identical issue ruled on by this Court in Madsen
II.

(R. 32-51.)
The depositors informed the lower court that the statute of

limitations issue was previously decided against Brimhall by the
Utah Supreme Court in Madsen II.

(R. 68-74; Transcript of

Proceedings November 14, 1989 pp. 21, 24, 26.)

The trial court

ignored the Madsen II ruling and granted Brimhall's motion.
B.

Legal Analysis.
An express ruling by the Utah Supreme Court on issues raised

by a prior appeal is the law of the case and binding upon the

parties, the trial court and any subsequent appellate court.
Prudential Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. St. Paul Insurance Co.,
22 Utah 2d 70, 448 P.2d 724 (Utah 1985); Corbett v. Fitzgerald. 709
P.2d 384 (Utah 1985); C & J Industries, Inc. v. Bailev. 669 P.2d
855 (Utah 1983); Davis v. Payne & Day, Inc., 12 Utah 2d 107, 363
P.2d 498 (1961).
The issue in Madsen II was whether Sections 78-12-26(4), 28(4)
or 29(8) barred
Borthick.

the depositors1

claims against

This Court ruled that they did not.

Brimhall and

The ruling is not

subject to further attack in a subsequent trial or a subsequent
appeal.
POINT II
THE STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS, ADVOCATED BY BRIMHALL,
DO NOT BAR THE DEPOSITORS' CLAIMS AGAINST HIM
A.

Factual Background.
The Department took over and closed Grove Finance on July 18,

1980.

Grove Finance responded by filing a Chapter 11 bankruptcy.

A trustee was appointed by the bankruptcy court to liquidate Grove
Finance.

The lower Court did not determine when the liquidation

occurred nor its results.
The depositors filed their first action against Mirvin D.
Borthick and the Department on March 1, 1981.

At that time, the

depositors did not know who the identity of Borthick's predecessor.
After Madsen I held that the former commissioners could only be
sued

in their personal capacities
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for gross negligence, the

depositors filed this action against Brimha^l and Borthick on July
20, 1983.
B.

Legal Analysis.
As set forth in Point I, Madsen II held that none of the

statute of limitations argued by Brimhall to the lower court bars
the depositors1 claims.
not.

There are numerous reasons why they do

The reasons follow:
1.

Utah Code Ann. SS 78-12-26(4), 78-12-28(1), and 78-1229(2) are inapplicable.

Section 78-12-28(1) creates a two year statute of limitations
for claims against a marshall, sheriff, constable or other officer
upon a liability incurred by the doing of an act in his official
capacity.

The depositors did not sue a marshall, a sheriff, a

constable or any other officer in his official capacity. They are
suing the former commissioners in their individual capacities.
Section 78-12-29(2) provides for a one year period in which to
sue for a statutory penalty or forfeiture where the action is given
to an individual.

The depositors are not sueing for a forfeiture

or penalty so the statute does not apply.
Section 78-12-26(4) is also inapplicable.

In Matheson v.

Pearson, 619 P.2d 321, 323 (Utah 1980), the Utah Supreme Court held
that Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25(2), a four years statute of
limitations is the correct statute for reckless conduct and all
forms of negligence.
17

2.

The complaint against Brimhall relates back to the
complaint against Borthick.

Brimhall, in his Madsen II brief before the Utah Supreme
Court, emphasized that he was identical in interest to Borthick for
statute of limitations purposes:
Commissioner Borthick was a named defendant in
the earlier case, and clearly a state official
such as Commissioner Brimhall is in privity
with the State, which was also a defendant in
Madsen I,
(Brimhallfs Brief in Madsen II p. 19.)
Ordinarily, a party may not be added after the statute of
limitations has run.

But, this rule is subject to an exception

where, as here, the timely sued defendant

(Borthick) and the

defendant added later (Brimhall) share an identity of interest. In
these circumstances, the adding of the new defendant relates back
to the filing of the original Complaint for statute of limitations
purposes.
The exception operates where there is a
relation back, as to both plaintiff and
defendant, when new and old parties have an
identity of interest; so it can be assumed or
proved the relation back is not prejudicial.
Doxey-Layton Co. v. Clark, 548 P.2d 902, 906 (Utah 1976).
Courts in other jurisdictions have held that where suit is
timely

commenced

against

a

public

officer,

the

plaintiff's

subsequent naming of another officer holding the same office is not
time barred, because the complaint relates back to the filing of
the original complaint.

e.g., Dougherty v. Payne, 291 F. 61 (5th
18

Cir.

1923);

Carolina

Bagging

Co.

v.

United

States

R.R.

Administration, 113 S.E. 595 (1922); Hines v. Chaddick, 63 S.W.2d
263 (Tex. App. 1933).
3.

The statute of limitations does r^ot begin to run until
the depositors lost their money.

Brimhall, in his motion for summary judgment in the lower
court, assumed that the statute of limitations began to run when
the commissioners
incorrect.

closed

Grove Finance.

That assumption is

The depositors did not sue the commissioners for

closing Grove Finance.

They sued the commissioners for breaching

the duties set forth in the Statement of Facts section of this
brief. The closing of the business enterprise does not, in and of
itself, cause the statute of limitations to begin to run.
Kimball v. McCormick, 20 Utah 189, 259 P.2d 313 (1927).

see,

Instead,

the statute begins to run when the cause of action accrues, e.g.,
Fredrickson v. Knight Land Co., 667 P.2d 34 (Utah 1983).

The

elements of a claim for gross negligence are: duty of care; a
grossly negligent breach of the duty; causation; and damages.
c.f., Williams v. Welbv, 699 P.2d 723, 726 (Utah 1985).
A negligence action generally accrues when all the elements
necessary to maintain the action are present and it is apparent
that the plaintiff has been damaged.

Samuelson v. Freeman, 454

P.2d 406 (Wash. 1969).

Damages, in this case, became apparent to

the

the

depositors

when

bankruptcy
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trustee

comoleted

the

liquidation of Grove Finance.

The lower court never determined

when the liquidation occurred.
4.

The applicable statute of limitations is four years.

Gross negligence or reckless conduct is a form of negligence
subject to the four year statute of limitations set forth in Utah
Code Ann. § 78-12-25(1).

Matheson v. Pearson, 619 P.2d 321, 322

(Utah 1980).
In summary, the statute of limitations does not bar the
depositors' claims against Brimhall, because: Madsen II ruled
otherwise, the statutes relied upon by Brimhall are inapplicable;
the complaint against Brimhall relates back to the Complaint filed
against Borthick; and the statute did not begin to run until the
depositors knew they were damaged.
POINT III
THE COMMISSIONERS HAD A DUTY TO EXAMINE, INVESTIGATE
AND SUPERVISE GROVE FINANCE, A SUPERVISED LENDER
ENGAGED IN THE BANKING BUSINESS
Utah statutory law imposes upon the commissioners numerous
comprehensive and specific duties to examine, investigate and
supervise Grove Finance. The duties are set forth in both Title 7
and Title 7OB of the Utah Code.
their Complaint.
A.

The depositors pled each duty in

(R. 2-8.)

Duties Under Title 7.
In 1985, the legislature repealed most of Title 7. Because

Grove Finance conducted a banking business until its closure in
20

1980 all cites in this brief are to Title 7 as it existed in 1980,
unless otherwise indicated.
Grove Finance was licensed as a small loan business under
Title 7 until 1969 and as a supervised lender thereafter.

From

1970 until its closure by Borthick in 1980, Grove Finance was a
corporation doing a banking business:
Any corporation holding itself out to the
public as receiving money in deposit whether
evidenced by a certificate, promissory note or
otherwise, shall be considered as doing a
banking business and shall be subject to the
provisions of this chapter as to such
business.
Utah Code Ann. § 7-1-3.
There is no genuine fact issue of whether Grove Finance
conducted a banking business.
Stuart depo. p. 578.)

(R. 556-559; Cox depo. p. 57;

In the addendum is a copy of a debenture

ledger used by Grove Finance. The ledger clearly shows that money
was periodically deposited and withdrawn at will by the depositors.
In

summary,

because

Grove

Finance

was

doing

a banking

business, it was subject to the provisions of Title 7.

Title 7

creates numerous specific and comprehensive duties upon the commissioners to examine, investigate and supervise Grove Finance.
Section 7-1-7 provides:
All banks, all loan and trust companies, all
building and loan companies, all credit
unions, all small loan business required to
obtain a license under any provision of law,
and all bank service companies shall be under
the supervision of the banking department and

shall be subject to examination by the bank
commissioner. . . .
Section 7-1-8 provides:
The bank commissioner . . . shall visit and
examine every bank, savings bank, every loan
and trust corporation, every building and loan
association, every industrial loan company,
every
small
loan
business, and every
cooperative bank, at least once a year. At
every such examination careful inquiry shall
be made as to the condition and resources of
each institution examined, the mode of
conducting and managing its affairs, the
official actions of its directors and
officers, the investment and disposition of
its funds, the security afforded to its
members, if any, and to those by whom its
engagements are held, whether or not it is
violating any provisions of law relating to
corporations or to the business of the
institution examined, whether or not it is
complying with its articles of incorporation
and bylaws, and as to such other matters as
the commissioner may prescribe.
Section 7-1-13 imposes a mandatory duty to notify the board of
directors of a banking business of any officer or employee found to
be dishonest, reckless, incompetent or failing to perform the
duties of his office.
Section 7-1-14 imposes a mandatory duty to require, at least
once a year, the board of directors of a banking business to
examine

its books

and affairs

with

the special

purpose of

ascertaining the value and security thereof and to cause a report
of that examination to be prepared for the commissioner.
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Section 7-1-17 creates a mandatory duty to call for not less
than four reports a year of the condition of each banking business
such as Grove Finance and to certify the report for publication.
Section 7-1-18 gives the commissioner the power to call for
special reports from any banking business when necessary.
Section 7-1-27 creates a mandatory duty to inform the county
attorney of any violation of the law by an officer, director or
employee of a banking business.
Section 7-1-26 give the commissioner the power to refuse to
grant approval for the filing of articles of incorporation of any
banking business which does not comply with the law of the state.
Section 7-10-7 provides the commissioners the power to revoke
or suspend the license of a banking business which has violated any
provision of Title 7.
Section 7-2-1 grants the commissioners the power to take
possession of the business and property of any banking business
which is conducting its business in an unauthorized or unsafe
manner.
The foregoing powers and duties are not discretionary.
word "shall" imposes a mandatory duty.
525 P.2d 728, 729 (Utah 1974).

The

Herr v. Salt Lake County,

Further, the Utah Supreme Court in

Tripp v. District Court of the Third Judicial District, 89 Utah 8,
56 P.2d 1355, 1359 (1936), ruled that Title 7 imposes mandatory
duties upon the commissioners:
23

Once each year it is made his duty to examine
certain institutions.
The public has such
interest in the maintenance of such institutions that the examiner is required to make
careful inquiry into the conditions and
resources of the institution. . . .
Id. at 1359.
In summary, Title 7 imposed specific mandatory duties upon the
commissioners to examine, and supervise Grove Finance.
B.

Title 70B.
In 1969, Utah adopted the Utah Uniform Consumer Credit Code as

Title 70B of the Utah Code.
stratorss of Title 70B.
Administrators
mandatory

of

Title

The commissioners

were the admini-

(Utah Code Ann. § 70B-6-103) .
70B, the

commissioners

duties to examine, investigate and

had

Utah Code Ann. § 70B-3-506(l) reads as follows:
The administrator shall examine periodically at intervals he deems appropriate
the loans, business and records of every
licensee. In addition, for the purpose
of discovering violations of this act or
securing information lawfully required,
the administrator or the official or
agency to whose supervision the organization is subject (section 70B-6-105) may
at any time investigate the loans,
business, and records of any regulated
lender. For these purposes he shall have
free and reasonable access to the
offices, places of business, and records
of the lender. (Emphasis added.)
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specific

supervise Grove

Finance.

(1)

As

To aid in the examination, subsection (3} of § 70B-3-506 gave
the commissioners
materials

subpoena power to require the production of

relevant to an

investigation,

including

"any books,

documents or other tangible things."
Utah Code Ann. § 70B-3-503(2) states:
(2)

No license shall be issued unless the
administrator, upon investigation, finds
that
the
financial
responsibility,
character and fitness of the applicant,
and of the members thereof (if the applicant is a copartnership or association)
and of the officers and directors thereof
(if the applicant is a corporation), are
such as to warrant belief that the
business will be operated honestly and
fairly within the purposes of this act.

Utah Code Ann. § 70B-3-504 provided th^t:
The administrator shall revoke or suspend the
license [of any licensee] if he finds that:
(a)
(b)

the licensee has repeatedly and willfully
violated this act or any rule or order
lawfully made pursuant to this act; or
facts or conditions exist which would
clearly have justified the administrator
in refusing to grant a license had these
facts or conditions been kno^n to exist
at the time the application for the
license was made. (Emphasis added.)

Utah Code Ann. § 70B-6-104(5) required the defendants1 to
issue a report on the results of the Commissioners examination and
supervision:
[T]he report shall include a description of
the examination and investigation procedures
and policies of his office. . . .
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The commissioners also had the statutory authority to issue
cease and desist orders and to bring civil actions to "restrain a
person from violating this act and for other appropriate relief,11
Utah Code Ann, § 70B-6-109, 110.
POINT IV
THE DUTIES RUN TO THE DEPOSITORS
A duty to control the conduct of third persons occurs if "a
special relation exists between the defendant [commissioners] and
the third person

[Grove Finance] which imposes a duty upon the

defendant to control the third person's conduct or [if] a special
relation

exists

between the defendant

plaintiff [depositors]."

[commissioners]

and

the

Owens v. Garfield, 784 P.2d 1187, 1189

(Utah 1989).
In this case, both relationships exist.
A.

The Relationship Between the Commissioners and Grove Finance
Requires that the Statutory Duties Run to the Depositors.
In Owens v. Garfield, 784 P.2d 1187, 1189 (Utah 1989) the Utah

Supreme Court ruled that whether "a sufficiently close relationship
in a legal sense" exists between the State and a third person
depends upon whether the third person is under the supervision of
or licensed by the State.

In Owens, the court held that the State

did not have a duty to control a child care provider because she
was not licensed nor supervised.
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[P]laintiffs do not attempt to construct, an
argument that defendants had a Sufficiently
close relationship in a legal sense with
Garfield to give rise to a duty to control her
activities.
Although both the DFS and the
County had been investigating Garfield. . .
she was not required to be licensed by the
State to be a day-care provider.
* * *

Garfield was not included in the class of daycare providers required to be licensed under
the Utah day-care licensing laws.
Because
this case does not involve a licensed day-care
provider, no duty can be predicated on the
licensing provisions.
Owens, at 1189, 1190.
In this case, as set forth in Point III of the brief, Grove
Finance was under the direct supervision of the commissioners and
Grove Finance was licensed by them.

Therefore, the legal

relationship exists between the commissioners and Grove Finance
which

imposes

upon

the

commissioners

the

duty

to

examine,

investigate and supervise Grove Finance foif the benefit of the
depositors.
B.

Utah's Statutory Banking Laws Require the Commissioners1
Duties to Run to the D e p o s i t o r s . I
When a statute evidences a clear intent to identify and

protect a particular class of persons, a negligence or gross
negligence tort action may be brought for the violation of the
statute.

As explained in Baerlein v. State, 92 Wash.2d 229, 595

P.2d 930, 932 (1979):
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Obviously a statute which by its terms creates
a duty to individuals can be the basis for a
negligence action where the statute is violated and the injured plaintiff was one of the
persons designed to be protected by the
legislation. A clear statement of legislative
intent to protect individuals does not need an
"exception" to the traditional rule; it is
simply a statutory duty imposed on the
governmental entity . . . if . . . the legislation evidences a clear intent to identify a
particular and circumscribed class of persons,
such person may bring an action in tort for
violation of the statute or ordinance.
Similarly, in Halverson v. Dahl, 89 Wash.2d 673, 574 P.2d 1190
(1978), the Washington Supreme Court stated:
Liability can be founded upon a . . . code if
that code by its terms evidences a clear
intent to identify and protect a particular
and circumscribed class of persons.
The special nature of the . . . code is found
. . . in the declaration of purpose.
Id. at 1192-93.
The question of whether a statute which evidences an intent to
protect a particular class of persons,imposes a duty for the
benefit of the protected class, was conclusively decided by this
Court in Little v. Utah State Division of Family Services, 667 P. 2d
49 (Utah 1983).

In Little, the plaintiffs brought a wrongful death

claim against the State for the death of their autistic infant
daughter. The plaintiffs claimed that the State was negligent for
failing to evaluate the foster home in which the infant was placed;
failing to supervise the infant's placement; and failing to protect
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the infant from harm. In affirming judgment against the State, the
Utah Supreme Court held:
The statute specifically includes a duty to
protect the child . . . we therefore hold that
the protection of law well extended to the
interests the plaintiffs here seek to vindicate.
Id. at 54.
The depositors, in this case, claim that they have been
damaged by the commissioners1

gross negligence in failing to

discharge the duties set forth in Title 7 and, alternatively, in
Title 7OB.

Both of those statutes evidence a clear intent to

protect a "particular and circumscribed clas$ of persons" of which
these plaintiffs are members.

As such, the ^uties set forth in

Title 7 and Title 70B run to the depositors.
Utah Code Ann. § 7-1-102 explains the legislative findings,
intent and purposes of Title 7. Subsection (1) (b) states that one
of the purposes of Title 7 is "to protect the depositors, customers
and shareholders of depository institutions paving their principle
place of business in this state."
Utah Code Ann. § 7-1-301 further identifies the depositors as
a group to be protected by Title 7.
commissioner

is given

Under Section 7-1-301 the

specific authority

to

issue rules "to

safeguard the interests of shareholders, members, depositors, and
other customers of institutions and other persons subject to the
jurisdiction of the department." (Emphasis ac^ded.)
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Similarly, the Legislature, in adapting Title 70B of Utah Code
Annotated, also targeted the depositors for protection. Utah Code
Ann. § 70B-6-103 provided that the Administrators of Title 70B are
the Commissioners.

Utah Code Ann. § 70B-1-102 outlined the

purposes of the statute. One purpose is to protect those who have
business dealings with supervised lenders.
Other courts have determined that banking statutes similar to
Utah's are intended to protect the depositors. These Courts ruled
that the statutory duties run to the depositors and allow the
depositors to pursue their claims against governmental entities and
their employees.

Examples follow:

In State v. Superior Court of Maricopa County, 123 Ariz. 324,
599 P.2d 777 (1979), a class of depositors brought an action
against

the Arizona

Corporation

Commission,

and employees.

Specifically, the depositors charged negligence in failing to make
yearly examinations of the thrifts, failing to examine according to
required standards, and failing to properly supervise and regulate
the affairs of the thrifts.
The Commission, like the commissioners in this case, asserted
that it's duty was "one owed to the public generally, and a breach
of this duty does not provide an individual with a cause of
action."
statutory

Id. at 785.
duties

and

The Court examined

determined
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that

the

the Commission's

statutory

language

"narrows the Corporation Commission's duty fnto a duty to protect
the injured depositors,"

id. at 785.

The duties listed in the Arizona statute are nearly identical
to the commissioners' duties in this case.

After citing those

duties, the Arizona Supreme Court stated:
To hold that article 17 does not create a duty
that extends from the Corporatiori Commission
to the individual depositor would be to render
the article meaningless.
Id. at 786.
Another factually similar case is Tch^repnin v. Franz, 570
F.2d 187 (7th Cir. 1978).

In that case, the Seventh Circuit Court

of Appeals held that a state official's statlutory duty to examine
and regulate state-chartered

savings and loan associations was

enforceable

depositors.

by

the

injured

After

reviewing

the

statutory duties, again, similar to the statutory duties of the
commissioners in this case, the court held:
[W]e find nothing in the Illinois Savings and
Loan Act to suggest that Knight [Financial
Institutions
Director]
was
charged
with
responsibilities
only
to
the
State
of
Illinois.
On the contrary, the Act .
indicates that the Association - and, more
specifically, its depositors - haVe a vested
right in the duties therein prescribed.
Id. at 191.
In summary, the duties set forth in Point III of this brief
run to the depositors. The depositors are entitled to move forward
on their claims because they were targeted ror protection by both
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Title 7 and Title 7OB and because Grove Finance was supervised and
licensed by the commissioners. Otherwise, this Court in Madsen II
could not have ruled, as it did, that the depositors may sue the
commissioners for their gross negligence.
POINT V
THE COMMISSIONERS CAN BE SUED PERSONALLY FOR GOVERNMENTAL ACTIONS WHEN THEY ARE GROSSLY NEGLIGENT
A.

Procedural Background.
In

ruling

that

the

commissioners

owed

no

duty

to the

depositors, the lower court accepted the "duty to all, duty to no
one" doctrine.
[B]orthick, in the discharge of his statutory
duty and responsibilities as the former
commissioner of the Department of Financial
Institutions owed no duty of care to
plaintiffs individually. . . . (R. 500).
B.

Legal Analysis.
1.

Introduction.

Application of "duty to all, duty to no one" doctrine in this
case is contrary to the Utah Governmental Immunity Act and this
court's ruling in Madsen II.
apply to individuals.

In addition, the doctrine does not

In short, the commissioners can be sued

personally for their governmental acts of gross negligence.

32

2.

The "duty to all, duty to no one" doctrine conflicts with
the governmental immunity act and Madsen II,

The common law "duty to all, duty to no one" doctrine directly
conflicts with the Utah Governmental Immunity Act as it existed
when

the depositors1

claims

arose.

Of

course, a common

doctrine contrary to legislation is of no force or effect.
Drennan v. Security Pacific National Bank, 621 P.2d

law

e.g.,

1318 (Cal.

1981); Board of County Commissioners of Nepsho County v. Central
Air Conditioning Co., 683 P.2d 1282 (Kansas 1984).
In 1980, when the depositors' claims a^rose, the Utah Governmental

Immunity

Act provided

that governmental

employees

were

personally liable for errors or omissions occurring during the
performance

of their duties

if the employee

acted with

negligence.

Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-4 (Supp^ 1979).

gross

In Madsen II, this Court specifically |held that the commissioners were not immune from liability to th4 depositors for gross
negligence

committed

in

their

individual

depositors could sue on their claims.

capacities.

The

To now conclude that the

commissioners are immune from suit is contrary to the judicial
(Madsen II) determination that the commissioners are liable to the
depositors for gross negligence.
It also amounts to nothing more than th^ improper repeal of a
legislative act.

In Brennen v. Eugene. 285 Or. 401, 591 P.2d 719

(1979) the Oregon Supreme Court explained:
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[W]e conclude . . • that any distinction
between "public" and "private" duty is
precluded by statute in this State, [citing
Oregon's Governmental Immunity Act]. . . . In
abolishing governmental tort immunity, the
Legislature specifically provided for certain
exceptions under which immunity would be
retained (citation omitted), and we find no
warrant
for
judicially
engrafting
an
additional exception onto the statute.
Id. at 725.
In summary, the Utah Supreme Court must consider the law as it
existed at the time the depositors1 claims arose.

At that time,

government officials, including the commissioners, were personally
liable and not immune from suit for gross negligence. A common law
duty doctrine, like the "duty to all, duty to no one" doctrine,
cannot recreate governmental immunity when the Legislature has
abolished it. Adams v. State, 555 P.2d 235 (Alaska 1976).
3.

The "duty to all, duty to no one" doctrine does not apply
to officials sued in their individual capacity.

The "duty to all, duty to no one" doctrine provides that in
order for an injured person to recover against a municipality, he
must show a breach of duty owed to the plaintiff as an individual
and not merely the breach of an obligation owed to the general
public.

Owens. supra at 1189 n. 2.; However, the depositors are

not suing a municipality or any other governmental entity.
commissioners are being sued as individuals.
District

Judge Timothy

Hansen,

in related

The

For that reason,
litigation, twice

rejected the commissioners "duty to all, duty to no one" argument.
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Hilton v. Borthick. Civil No. C82-3798. |ee ; Exhibit D in the
Addendum.
4.

The governmental immunity act requires, these defendants
to be treated like any other individual defendants.

Even if the "duty to all, duty to no on£" doctrine applies to
individuals, and it does not, the Utah Governmental Immunity Act
abrogated the doctrine.
Section 63-30-4 of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, as it
existed in 1980 and now, provides:
Wherein immunity from suit is waived by this
act, consent to be sued is granted and liability of the entity shall be determined as if
the entity were a private person. (Emphasis
added.)
In Madsen_II, this Court ruled that the Utah Governmental
Immunity Act waived immunity on claims for gross negligence.
Liability

must,

therefore,

be

determiried

as

though

the

commissioners are private persons.
i

If the commissioners1 liability is determined as that of a
private person, the "duty to all, duty to no one" doctrine is
inapplicable. As explained by the Alaska Supreme Court in Adams v.
State, 555 P.2d 235 (Alaska 1976):
Thus, if the defendant fState] were considered
a private entity, its duty to the plaintiffs
or their decedents would be clear.
* * *
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An application of the public duty doctrine
here would result in finding no duty owed to
the plaintiffs or their decedents by the
State, because although they were foreseeable
victims and a private defendant would have
owed such a duty, no "special relationship"
between the parties existed. Why should the
establishment of duty become more difficult
when the State is the defendant? Where there
is no immunity, the State is to be treated
like a private litigant. To allow the public
duty doctrine to disturb this equality would
create immunity where the legislature has not.
(Emphasis added).
Id. at 241-42.
In summary, the Utah Government Immunity Act waived immunity
for governmental employees1 gross negligence and requires that
their duties and liability be determined in the same fashion as
that of other individuals.
POINT VI
ANY ALLEGED GOOD-FAITH OF THE COMMISSIONERS
DOES NOT BAR THE DEPOSITORS' CLAIMS
A.

The Common Law Concept of Good-Faith Qualified Immunity is
Contrary to the Governmental Immunity Act.
As discussed in Points III, IV and V of this brief, the Utah

Legislature has specifically waived immunity on this claim for
gross negligence against the commissioners.

(Madsen II) .

The

good-faith qualified immunity doctrine is contrary to a claim for
gross negligence. The Utah Supreme Court explained the reason for
the doctrine:
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It would be quite impractical and unfair to
require them [public officials] to act at
their own risk. This would not only be disruptive of the proper functioning of public
institutions, but undoubtedly would dissuade
competent and responsible persons from accepting the responsibilities of public office.
Anderson v. Granite School District, 17 Utah 2d 405, 407, 413 P.2d
597 (1966).
That reasoning falls apart when, as here, the Legislature has
specifically authorized actions against public officials for gross
negligence. The Legislature has clearly determined that there is
no good-faith qualified immunity in an action for gross negligence.
B.

Good-faith Qualified Immunity Does Not Apply Because the
Duties and Powers Provided in Utah's Banking Statutes are not
Discretionary.
Good-faith qualified immunity applies when an official is

performing a discretionary function.

Utah State University v.

Sutro & Co., 646 P.2d 715, 721 (Utah 1982).

Qualified immunity

does not apply to a public official's performance of ministerial
duties.

Ministerial duties include those which are mandatory and

imperative, the performance of which leaves nothing for judgment or
discretion, e.g. , Tcherepnin v. Franz. 570 F.2d 187, 191 (7th Cir.
1987) .
As discussed in Point III of this brief, the commissioner's
duties to examine and supervise Grove Finance were not discretionary, but mandatory and ministerial.
immunity does not apply to this case.
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Thus, good-faith qualified
In State ex rel. Funk v.

Turner, 42 S.W.2d 594 (Mo. 1931), the Missouri Supreme Court looked
at the statutory duty to examine and said:
The difficulty arises in a classification of
the duties of a bank examiner, whether discretionary or ministerial.
To resolve this
question we must refer to Section 11689 R.S.
Mo. 1919. This section makes it mandatory
that every bank be examined at least once a
year. . . . On every such examination inquiry
shall be made as to the condition and resources of such corporation or banker, the mode of
conducting and managing its affairs . . . the
investment of its funds, and safety and
prudence of its management, the security
afforded to those by whom its engagements are
held. . . .
By the provisions of this section, the
commissioner
must
make
at
least
one
examination each year. This duty is not a
discretionary one, but it is ministerial;
he has no alternative or choice in the matter.
. . . We are also of the opinion that this
section makes it the mandatory duty of the
officer who conducts the investigation, to
inquire into the various matters set out in
the statute. Since it is mandatory it becomes
a ministerial duty. . . .
Id. at 598.
The language of the Missouri statute is almost word for word
identical to Title 7 as it existed in 1980. For example, Utah Code
Ann. § 70B-3-506 provided that:
The administrator shall examine periodically
at intervals he deems appropriate the loans,
business and records of each licensee.
The duty to examine is mandatory and, therefore, ministerial
and not protected by the doctrine of good-faith qualified immunity.
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POINT VII
WHETHER THE COMMISSIONERS PERFORMED THEIR STATUTORY
DUTIES HONESTLY AND IN GOOD FAITH ARE QUESTIONS
OF FACT PRECLUDING A MOTION FOR JUDGMENT
ON THE PLEADINGS
The common law defense of good-faith qualified

immunity

applies when the defendants perform their statutory duties honestly
and good faith.
1952)•

e.g. , Hiorth v. Whittenburcr, 241 P.2d 907 (Utah

Whether the commissioners: (1) performed their duties (2)

honestly, and (3) in good faith are all questions of fact.
Smith v. Losee, 485 F.2d 334, 345 (10th Cir. 1973).

see.

In the lower

court there was no factual showing that the duties were performed
nor that they were performed honestly and in good faith.

A trial

is necessary to resolve the factual questions.
POINT VIII
RES JUDICATA PRECLUDES THE COMMISSIONERS FROM
RAISING THE "DUTY TO ALL, DUTY TO NO ONE11 DEFENSE
A.

Factual Background.
This litigation is not the first litigation to occur between

the parties.

As set forth in the Statement of Facts section of

this Brief, the depositors commenced the litigation by suing the
State Department of Financial Institutions and the commissioners in
their official capacity.

The depositors alleged that the Depart-

ment and the commissioners, in their official capacity, negligently
failed to perform their statutory duties.

In "Madsen I", this

Court ruled that the State and the defendants, in their official
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capacity, were immune from the depositors1 claims.

In the Madsen

I litigation, the defendants did not raise the "duty to all, duty
to no one" defense.
B.

Legal Analysis.
The protection offered by the Governmental Immunity statute is

an affirmative defense which may be waived,
93 P. 561 (Utah 1908).

see. Bowman v. Ogden,

The "duty to all, duty to no one" or the

"public duty defense" is in reality only a form of the governmental
immunity defense. As explained by the Arizona Court of Appeals in
Bill Moore Motor Homes, Inc. v. State, 629 P.2d 1024, 1029 n. 4
(1981) :
In our view, the dichotomy of public versus
private duty has created more problems that it
has solved . . . [w]e think that the publicprivate duty dichotomy is a shield very much
like the shield of governmental immunity....
It makes no difference whether we call the
remaining shield "no duty" or governmental
immunity.
Res judicata contains two branches, claims preclusion and
issue preclusion, e.g., Penrod v. Nu Creation Creme Inc., 669 P.2d
873 (Utah 1983); Swainston v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 766
P.2d 1059 (1988).

Claims preclusion prevents re-litigation of

claims that could and should have been litigated in the prior
action but were not.

Penrod, supra; Swainston, supra.

The issue

in this case is whether the affirmative defense of a "duty to all,
duty to no one" doctrine should be treated as a claim.
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A claim is "the aggregate of operative facts which gives rise
to a right enforceable in the courts."
seek judicial interference.
a remedy.

A claim

It provides the right to

A claim petitions the court to award

is resolved by a judicial pronouncement

providing the requested remedy. Swainston v. Intermountain Health
Care, Inc. , 766 P.2d

1059, 1061

(Utah 1988).

Similarly, an

affirmative defense does not require a finding of fact.

Instead,

an affirmative defense requests a judicial pronouncement denying
the requested remedy.

For these reasons, and others, courts which

have considered the issue ruled that res judicata bars not only
claims that should have been raised in the prior proceeding but
also affirmative defenses, e.g., Americana Fabrics, Inc. v. L & L
Textiles, Inc., 754 F.2d 1524 (9th Cir. 1985); Southmark Properties
v. Charles House Corp., 742 F.2d 862 (8th Cir. 1984); Lundberg v.
Stinson, 695 P.2d
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(Hawaii App. 1985); Sciarrone v. Life

Insurance Co. of Virginia, 313 S.E.2d 322 (S.C. App. 1984).
In summary, the "duty to all, duty to no one" doctrine is an
affirmative defense applicable to governmental entities.

The

defense could and should have been raised in Madsen I.

Res

judicata bars the defense from being raised in this action.
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POINT IX
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN FAILING
TO CERTIFY THE LITIGATION AS A CLASS ACTION
A.

Factual Background.
Early in the litigation, the depositors filed two motions to

certify the litigation as a class action.

The grounds for the

motions were:
1.

Collateral estoppel requires this case to be certified as
a class action.

2.

The case meets the numerosity, commonality, typicality
and adequate representation requirements of Rule 23(a)
and the superiority required by Rule 23(b).

(R. 142-158, 401-402, 407-412, 468-488.)
In opposing the motion, the commissioners did not argue that
this action does not meets the criteria set forth in U.R.C.P. 23.
Instead the commissioners said:
1.

The depositors are seeking to consolidate this case with
Hilton v. Borthick.

2.

The statute of limitations bars the unnamed depositors1
claims so a class action should be denied.

3.

Res judicata bars any potential class from suing the
commissioners for gross negligence.

(R. 277-291, 413-446, 458-463.)
The court, without explanation, denied both motions for class
certification.

(R. 499-500.)
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B.

Legal Analysis,
1.

The only criteria to be used in determining whether
litigation should be certified as a class action is set
forth in U.R.C.P. 23.

The criteria for determining whether an action should be
maintained as a class action is set forth in U.R.C.P. 23.
It is the duty of the district court to apply
carefully the criteria set forth in Rule 23(a)
and (b) to the facts of the case to determine
whether an action may be maintained as a class
action. (Citation omitted.) If the criteria
of Rule 23 is complied with, it is within the
sound discretion of the district court to
determine whether a suit . . . should proceed
as a class action.
Richardson v. Arizona Fuels Corp., 614 P.2d 636, 639 (Utah 1980).
None of the Commissioner's arguments moved to the lower Court
have anything to do with the elements set forth in U.R.C.P. 23.
Reasons two and three are arguments which go to the merits of the
litigation. The question of whether it is proper for a lower court
to make a preliminary determination on the merits of the litigation
prior to ruling on certification of the class was conclusively
decided in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacguelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974).]
The United States Supreme Court ruled that the question of class
certification must be treated entirely independent of the merits of
the litigation.

The Court explained:

^isen v. Carlisle was cited in Holmgren v. Utah-Idaho Sugar
Co. , 582 P. 2d 856, 860 n. 3 (1978) with approval as properly
construing the identical Federal Rule 23.
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We find nothing in either the language or
history of Rule 2 3 that gives a court any
authority to conduct a preliminary inquiry
into the merits of a suit in order to
determine whether it may be maintained as a
class action.
Indeed, such a procedure
contravenes the Rule by allowing a representative plaintiff to secure the benefits of a
class action without first satisfying the
requirements for it. . . . This procedure is
directly contrary to the command of subdivision (c)(1) that the court determine whether a
suit denominated a class action may be
maintained as such as soon as practicable
after the commencement of the action. . . . In
determining the propriety of a class action,
the question is not whether the plaintiff or
plaintiffs have stated a cause of action or
will prevail on the merits but rather whether
the requirements of Rule 2 3 are met.
Risen, at 177-78.
2.

It was reversible error for the court to consider legal
issues other than the criteria of Rule 23.
If the denial of class certification was
influenced
by
the
court's
preliminary
evaluation of the merits . . . the court
committed error.
[Njothing in either the
language or history of Rule 23 . . . gives the
court any authority to conclude a preclusionary inquiry into the merits of a suit in order
to determine whether it may be maintained as a
class action.

Anderson v. City of Albuquerque, 690 F.2d 796, 799 (11th Cir.
1982).

see, Call v. West Jordan, 727 P.2d 180, 183 (Utah 1986).

(We will reverse a trial court's decision on class action status
when it is shown that the trial court misapplied the law.)
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3.

This litigation meets the criteria set forth in Rule 23.

Rule 2 3 contains five requirements: numerosity, commonality,
typicality, adequate representation and superiority.

This liti-

gation meets each requirement.
This case satisfies Rule 23(a) (1) on numerosity. Rule 23(a) (1)
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
One or more members of a class may sue or be
sued as representative parties . . . only if
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of
all members is impracticable.
Grove Finance had approximately 1250 depositors or customers
when it became insolvent.

There is no serious question that the

numerosity requirement is satisfied.
This case satisfies Rule 23(a)(2) on commonality.

Rule

23(a)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that:
One or more members of a class may sue or be
sued as representative parties on behalf of
all only if . . . (2) There are questions of
law or fact common to the class.
In this case, common questions abound.

For example, whether

or not defendants were grossly negligent is a question common to
each depositor as are all the elements in the gross negligence
claim.
This case satisfies Rule 23(a)(3) on typicality. Rule 23(a)(3)
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states?
One or more members of a class may sue or be
sued as representative parties on behalf of
all only if . . . (3) the claims or defenses
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of the representative party are typical of the
claims or defenses of the class.
In this case, the claims of Madsen, Swensen, Anderson, Hilton,
Helland and The Middle East Foundation are typical of the claims of
all other depositors because they all lost money when Grove Finance
became defunct.
This case satisfies the requirements of Rule 23(a)(4) with
respect to adequate representation.

Rule 23(a)(4) of the Utah

Rules of Civil Procedure state that:
One or more members of a class may sue or be
sued as representative parties on behalf of
all only if . . . (4) the representative party
will fairly and adequately protect the
interests of the class.
In this case, Madsen, Swensen, Anderson, Hilton, Helland and The
Middle East Foundation have demonstrated that they will adequately
protect the interests of the class in that they have employed
experienced counsel and the case has been vigorously pursued.
This case satisfies the requirements of Rule 23(b)(3) on
superiority.

Rule 23(b)(3) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure

provides that:
An action may be maintained as a class action
if . . . the court finds that the questions of
law or facts common to the members of the
class predominate over any questions affecting
only individual members, and that a class
action is superior to other available methods
for the fair and efficient adjudication of the
controversy.
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Here, the class action is not only superior, it is probably
the only method available for the adjudication of this controversy.
The alternative, it would seem, would be for a thousand or so
individuals to file individual lawsuits.
In summary, there is absolutely no question that the requirements of Rule 23 are met in this litigation.

For that reason, the

commissioners never contested the Rule 23 requirements in the lower
court.
4.

Collateral estoppel requires
certified as a class action.

that

this

action

be

The bankruptcy of Grove Finance sponsored several overlapping
lawsuits.

A companion case is Hilton v. Borthick, Civil No. C82-

5165, C82-5877 and C82-5198 an action brought by the depositors
against commissioner Borthick on a negligence theory.

Third

Judicial District Court Judge Philip Fishier certified the companion case as a class action. See Exhibit E of the Addendum.

In

order to certify the class, the trial court should have considered
the factual touchstones in Rule 23.
A fact issue established in a prior action, will be binding in
a subsequent action if:
1.

The fact issue decided in the prior adjudication is
identical with the fact issue presented in the second
action.

2.

There was a final judgment on the merits.
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3.

The parties are the same in both actions (or in privity) .

4.

The fact issue was fairly litigated in the first action.

Searle Bros, v. Searle, 588 P.2d 689 (Utah 1978).
Each of the above requirements has been met.
commissioners

did

not

even

argue

that

the

Indeed, the

requirements

of

collateral estoppel have not been met.
5.

The statute of limitations does not bar the claim of the
unnamed depositors.

Even if it was proper for the trial court to consider whether
a statute of limitations barred the unnamed depositors' claims, and
it was not the statute of limitations does not preclude a class
action because it does not bar the claims.
Madsen II held that the named depositors timely commenced this
class action. Madsen II at 245, 254. The filing of a class action
completely tolls the statute of limitations for all asserted
members of the class until a final ruling on class action status.
American Pipe and Construction Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538 (1974);
Crown Cork and Seal Co. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345 (1983).

The

statute of limitations will not begin to run until this Court rules
on the class action issue.
6.

The depositors do not seek to consolidate this case with
Hilton v. Borthick.

In the lower court, the commissioners, without any explanation, asserted that class action status should be denied because
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the depositors were seeking to consolidate this case with Hilton v.
Borthick.

Whether or not the depositors seek to consolidate a case

is not part of the Rule 2 3 criteria and should not have been
considered by the lower court.
not

seek

to

consolidate

any

Nevertheless, the depositors did
case.

In Hilton,

the

case was

dismissed because the trial court ruled that the negligent acts of
the commissioners were protected by governmental

immunity.

In

contrast, this is an action for gross negligence not protected by
governmental immunity.

The depositors do not seek a consolidation

of cases.
POINT X
THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT FAILED
TO STATE ANY REASONS FOR DENYING CLASS ACTION
CERTIFICATION TO THIS LITIGATION
As set forth in Point IX, it is reversible error for a lower
court not to apply Rule 2 3 or to apply any other criteria but that
found in Rule 23, in deciding whether the litigaiton should be
certified as a class action.

However, it is also reversible error

for the court, as in this case, not to state its reasons for
denying class certification.

Without a statement, it is often

impossible to discern whether the court applied or misapplied Rule
23.

Fink v. National Savings & Trust Co. , 772 F.2d 951, 960-61

(D.C. Cir. 1985).
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XI.
CONCLUSION
Neither a statute of limitations, the "duty to all, duty to no
one" doctrine nor common law defense of good faith qualified
immunity justify the court's entry of a summary judgment and
judgment on the pleadings dismissing the depositors1 claims for
gross negligence against the commissioners.

In summary, the

depositors can sue the Commissioners for their gross negligence.
The lower court failed to apply U.R.C.P. 23 in deciding not to
certify this litigation as a class action and the court failed to
state any reason for denying class action certification.
For these reasons, the orders of the lower court should be
reversed, this litigation certified as a class action and remanded
for trial.

• ^/^ 2Q ^day of December, 1990.
DATED this
LIS / ^ Q day ol
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

RICHARD D. MADSEN and NANCY
MADSEN, his wife, BOYD A.
SWENSEN and BEATRICE SWENSEN, his wife, BLAINE
ANDERSON and SHEREE
ANDERSON, his wife, HOPE A .
HILTON, CYNTHIA HILTON,
RALPH M. HILTON, GENE
HELLAND and the MIDDLE EAST
FOUNDATION,

ORDER DENTING PLAINTIFFS'
MOTIONS FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION AND GRANTING MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF DEFENDANT W. SMOOT BRIMHALL

Plaintiffs,
vs.

Civil No. C-83-5404

MIRVIN D. BORTHICK, W. SMOOT
BRIMHALL, and JOHN DOES I to
V, being former Commissioners of the Utah Department
of Financial Institutions,

Judge Pat B. Brian

Defendants.

Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification and Second
Motion for Class Certification, and the Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendant W. Smoot Brimhall, came on for hearing before
the Court in the above-captioned action on Tuesday, November 14,
1989, at 1:30 p.m. Plaintiffs were represented by their counsel,
Robert J. DeBry of Robert J. DeBry and Associates, and Defendants

were represented by their counsel, Stephen J. Sorenson, Assistant
Attorney General. The Court had previously reviewed the memoranda
and exhibits on file pertaining to these motions, and heard
extensive argument from counsel at the hearing. The Court also
granted leave for counsel to submit further supplemental memoranda on the motions, has received such memoranda from each counsel/
and has reviewed them carefully* The Court thus being well advised in the premises,
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification and Second Motion for Class
Certification are hereby denied.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the
Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendant W. Smoot Brimhall is
hereby granted, and this action dismissed with prejudice as to
Defendant Brimhall.
DATED this

JI

day of

•
/

/

SZ'f

/S

tZ^r

BY THE COURT:

HONORABLE PAT B. BREM*—^
District Judge
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MAY
R. PAUL VAN DAM - 3312
Attorney General
JOHN P. SOLTIS - 3040
REED M. STRINGHAM - 4679
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Defendants
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Telephone: (801) 538-1016
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

RICHARD D. MADSEN and NANCY
MADSEN, his wife, BOYD A.
SWENSEN and BEATRICE
SWENSEN, his wife, BLAINE
ANDERSON and SHEREE
ANDERSON, his wife, HOPE A.
HILTON, CYNTHIA HILTON,
RALPH M. HILTON, GENE
HELLAND and the MIDDLE EAST
FOUNDATION,

j
lt
iI

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE
PLEADINGS

j
i!

Plaintiff,

Civil No. C-83-5404
Judge Pat B. Brian

vs.
MIRVIN D. BORTHICK, W. SMOOT
BRIMHALL, and JOHN DOES I to
V, being former
Commissioners of the Utah
Department of Financial
Institutions,
Defendants.

I
i
i
i

Defendant Mirvin D. Borthick's motion for judgment on
the pleadings came before the Court on April 6, 1990.

Plaintiffs

were represented by Gordon K. Jensen, Esq. and Edward T. Wells,
Esq., and defendant was represented by John P. Soltis and Reed M.
Stringham III, Assistant Attornevs Genpr^l.

The Court having reviewed the pleadings, motion and
memoranda on file, and having heard argument on the motion, now
makes and enters the following order:
1.

Defendant Mirvin D. Borthick, in the discharge of

his statutory duties and responsibilities as the former
Commissioner of the Utah Department of Financial Institutions,
owed no duty of care to plaintiffs individually on which a cause
of action for gross negligence can be based.
2.

The plaintiffs allege that defendant Mirvin D.

Borthick was grossly negligent in the manner in which he
discharged his statutory duties and responsibilities as former
Commissioner of the Utah Department of Financial Institutions.
As a matter of law, the interpretation of the statutes that
describe his duties and responsibilities is a discretionary act
and is protected in this action by the doctrine of good faith
immunity.
3.

Plaintiffs' complaint fails to state a cause of

action against defendant in his individual capacity as a matter
of law.
4.

The motion for judgment on the pleadings is

granted.
DATED this

7

day of

//? / d Of

, 1990,

BY THE COURT:

PAT B. BRIAN
District Court Judge
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
This is to certify that I mailed and sent by telefax
(262-8995), a copy of the foregoing Order Granting Defendant's
Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, to the following this

Jf

** day of

rlf*,/

, 1990:

Gordon K. Jensen, Esq.
Edward T. Wells, Esq.
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
4252 South 700 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
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EXHIBIT B

R. PAUL VAN DAM Attorney General
STEPHEN J. SORENSON - 3049
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellees
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Telephone:
(801) 538-1016
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

RICHARD D. MADSEN and NANCY
MADSEN, BOYD A. SWENSEN and
BEATRICE SWENSEN, BLAINE
ANDERSON and SHERREE
ANDERSON, HOPE A. HILTON,
CYNTHIA HILTON, RALPH M.
HILTON, GENE HELLAND and THE
MIDDLE EAST FOUNDATION,

i
«
PETITION FOR REHEARING
l
i

Plaintiffs/Appellants,
vs.
MIRVIN D. BORTHICK, W. SMOOT
BRIMHALL, and John Does I
to V, being former Commissioners of the Utah Department of Financial Institutions ,,

iI

Case No. 19704

i
i

Defendants/Respondents.

i

Defendant and Appellee W. Smoot Brimhall, by and
through his counsel of record, pursuant to Rule 35 of the Rules
of the Utah Supreme Court, petitions the Court for rehearing in
the above-captioned matter on the limited question of the appli-

cation of Utah Code Ann. S 78-12-40 to this Appellee, in light of
the fact that he was not named a party defendant in the predecessor action to this.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
This action arises out of the failure of Pleasant Grove
Finance Company, which occurred on or about July 18, 1980 (R. 5)
Plaintiffs in this action, investors in Grove Finance, filed an
action in March of 1981 against Mirvin Borthick, former Commissioner of Financial Institutions, and against the State of Utah
(R. 35). That action was dismissed by the District Court for
failure to file a notice of claim, and the dismissal was affirmed
by this Court in Madsen v. Borthick, 658 P.2d 627 (Utah 1983)
[hereinafter "Madsen I"]. Former Commissioner W. Smoot Brimhall
was not named a party in that action (see, e.g., caption of
Madsen I, 658: P ^ L a t 627)^.
Orwuly 20,(19834<R. 2), the investors filed their
Complaint in this action, deleting the State as a defendant,
adding Commissioner Brimhall (Commissioners Borthick's immediate
predecessor), and changing allegations of "negligence" to "gross
Footnote 8 of this Court's opinion in this case, 97
Utah Adv. Rep. at 19, states that the parties have conceded and
the Court assumes for purposes of the appeal "that the cause of
action arose on June 18, 1980, the date of Grove Finance's closure by the State." The same statement is made at 97 Utah Adv.
Rep. at 18. Appellee believes that the correct date was July 18,
1980, since this is the date alleged in the Plaintiffs' Complaint
(R. 5) and relied upon by the parties in proceedings below (e.g.,
R. 47-8, 71).

negligence,"

but otherwise attempting to set forth the same

cause of action as that in Madsen I. The District Court granted
the State's motion for summary judgment on grounds of res judicata , failure to file a notice of claim under the Governmental
Immunity Act, and application of the three possible statutes of
limitation (R. 89-90). This Court reversed in Madsen v. Borthick,
97 Utah Adv. Rep. 13 (1988) (wMadsen II").
BASIS FOR STATUTE OF LIMITATION RULING IN MADSEN II
Appellees had argued in the District Court that the
present action was barred by one of three possible statutes of
limitation (R. 4 7-49) , and that the statutes were not tolled by
Commissioner Brimhall was served with summons on July
21, 1983 (R. 9).
3

Utah Code Ann. S 78-12-26(4) provides:
Within three years:
•• •

[A]n action for a liability created by
the statutes of this state, other than for a
penalty or forfeiture under the laws of this
state, except where in special cases a different limitation is prescribed by the statutes of this state.
Utah Code Ann. S 78-12-28(1) provides:
Within two years, an action:
[A]gainst a marshall, sheriff, constable, or other officer upon a liability incurred by the doing of an act in his official
capacity, and by virtue of his office, or by
the omission of an official duty....
Utah Code Ann. S 78-12-29(2) provides:

•3-

4
Utah Code Ann. S 78-12-40

since, due to the failure to file a

notice a claim, the action was not -commenced within due time"
(R. 77), This Court rejected that argument in Madsen II, reasoning that an action is commenced "by the filing of a complaint or
the service of a summons, not by the filing of a notice of
claim," 97 Utah Adv. Rep. at 18, and that "if dismissal of a
first action is appealed, section 78-12-40's extension of time
for filing a second action runs from the date of the dismissal's
affirmance." Id.
In so ruling, however, the Court overlooked the fact
that Commissioner Brimhall was never named in Madsen I, and
therefore no action was commenced against him in due time to be
subject to the saving provision of S 78-12-40. In the District
3

3
Cont.

Cont.

Within one year:

•• •

An action upon a statute for a penalty
or forfeiture where the action is given to an
individual...
4
That section provides:
If any action is commenced within due
time and a judgment thereon for the plaintiff
is reversed, or if the plaintiff fails in
such action or upon a cause of action other
wise than upon the merits, and the time
limited either by law or contract for commencing the same shall have expired, the
plaintiff, or if he dies and the cause of
action survives, his representatives, may
commence a new action within one year after
the reversal or failure.

-4-

Court, the Plaintiffs candidly conceded as follows:
Plaintiffs filed the complaint with the
court in the instant action on July 20, 1983.
The cause of action arose when Grove Finance
was forced to close its doors on July 18,
1983. Under normal circumstances, the action
would have been barred by the statute of
limitations which at most ran for three years
and thus, possibly expired on July 18, 1983.
However, Section 78-12-40, Utah Code Ann.,
applies in this matter...
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, R. 71 (emphasis added). Plaintiffs made no argument, in the
District Court or this Court, that any statute of limitation
other than one of the three cited by the Commissioners should
apply> and conceded that the filing of the action was more than
three years beyond the date on which it arose.

Section 78-12-40

cannot reasonably be construed as applying to Commissioner Brimhall, since no action, timely or otherwise, was commenced against

Appellees submit that this action is clearly based upon a
liability incurred by a public officer "by the omission of an
official duty," i.e., as the plaintiffs allege, the Commissioners' failure adequately to supervise Grove Finance, and that the
two-year statute in Utah Code Ann. S 78-12-28(1) would seem most
squarely on point. On the other hand, this Court noted in Madsen
JI that enactment in 1978 of S 63-30-4 of the Governmental Immunity Act established a new statutory standard for official immunity, and precluded "all statutory or commonlaw causes of action
against an employee in his or her personal capacity for acts or
omissions which occur during the performance of the employee's
duties, except as authorized in the Governmental Immunity Act."
658 P.2d at 633. Thus, any action brought against an official in
his personal capacity for omissions occurring during the performance of his duties is brought under provisions of the Immunity
Act, and the three-year statute regarding "liability created by
the statutes of this state" may also apply.

•5-

him until more than three years after the doors of Grove Finance
closed.
Commissioner Brimhall pointed out to the District Court
(R. 35-6, 38-9) and to ^his/Court (Brief of ^ s p n n ^ n t g j pp._?j
19) that he was not n^med as a defendant in the earlier action.
Although argument of the statute-of-limitation issue centered on
the application of S 78-12-40 generally, Commissioner Brimhall
submits that the Court should reconsider its application as to
him, so as to avoid permitting a suit which even the plaintiffs
concede, absent any involvement by him in the earlier suit, was
untimely filed.
CONCLUSION
Appellee W. Smoot Brimhall prays the Court to reconsider its decision on the narrow issue of application of Utah Code
Ann. S 78-12-40 to him, in light of the fact that he was not a
named defendant in Madsen I.
DATED t h i s

~rf/

day of

JX/sMt^

1989.
/

R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General
<?

'>C

y

STEPHEN JV^SORENSON
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Defendant and
Appellee W. Smoot Brimhall
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
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following this . 7 ^ ,-

*

Daniel F. Bertch
Robert J. DeBry
sccnrTATES^
ROBERT J. DeBRY & ASSOCIATES
4001 South 700 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107

EXHIBIT C

SUPREME COURT ^OETIUTAH

STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH
March 16, 1989
OFFICE OF THE CLERK
Daniel F. Bertch
Robert J. Debry, Esq.
Phillip B. Shell, Esq,
Robert J. Debry St Associates
4001 South 700 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
RESENT
Richard D. Madsen and Nancy Madsen,
his wife, Boyd A. Swensen and Beatrice
Swensen, his wife, Blaine Anderson and
Sheree Anderson, his wife, Hope A. Hilton,
Cynthia Hilton, Ralph M. Hilton, Gene
Helland and the Middle East Foundation,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
v.
No. 19704
Mirvin D. Borthick, W. Smoot Brimhall,
and John Does I to V, being former
Commissioners of the Utah Department
of Financial Institutions,
Defendants and Appellees.

THIS DAY, Petition for Rehearing having been heretofore
considered, and the Court being sufficiently advised in the
premises, it is ordered that a rehearing be, and the same is,
denied.

Geoffrey J. Butlep, Clerk

EXHIBIT D

FILED IN CLERK'S OFFICE
Salt Lake County, Utah

APR 20 1934
H. Di*on Kinney. C^trV 3rd D**t. Court
By

Deputy Cleft.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MATHEW FENN HILTON, et al.,

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Plaintiffs,

CIVIL NOS. C-82-5165
C-82-5872

vs

C-82-3798

MIRVIN D. BORTHICK, et al..

(Consolidated)
Defendants.

The Motions of the plaintiffs for Summary Judgment, and the
reciprocal Motions for Summary Judgment of the defendants all
came on regularly for hearing on November 3, 1983.

Argument

was had on that date, and the hearing was continued to November 8,
1983 for further argument.

The matters before the Court in the

above-referenced civil numbers have all been consolidated
into one action.

All interested parties were present or

represented by counsel at the hearings above-referenced.

Counsel

argued their respective positions, and the Cdurt granted
defendants1 Motion to open and publish Depositions of Howard
Sherwood and Mirvin Borthick.

The Court took the matter under

advisement to further review the extensive Memoranda filed by
the parties, and to review the case law cited by counsel. The
Court has now carefully considered the arguments advanced by

HILTON, ET AL VS.
BORTHICK, ET Ah
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MEMORANDUM DECISION

the respective parties, and the case law authority cited by
all counsel to the controversy, and otherwise being fully
advised, enters the following Memorandum Decision.
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Based upon the Court's review of this matter, including
the Affidavits, Depositions and matters in the file and the legal
authorities cited, the Court concludes that, the plaintiffs' Motion
for Summary Judgment must be denied in that there are existing
significant and material issues of fact to be determined by the
trier of fact.

The material issues of fact prohibit this Court from

passing on the questions presented as a matter of law on a
motion for summary judgment.

Likewise, plaintiffs1 more limited

request, presented orallv at the time of the argument in this
matter, that this Court determine at this stage of the proceedings
what statutory duties, if any there be, apply to the facts of
this case, must also be denied.

This Court should not, under

the disputed facts of this case, determine what statutory
standards may apply to the defendants at this stage of the
proceedings.

Such a decision should be made when the evidence

is in, or sufficient evidence is presented to allow this Court
to reach some determinations on the respective theories of
liability, and make appropriate decisions based upon the evidence
then presented as to what statutory duties or other duties
that may run from the defendants to the plaintiffs may be.

HILTON, ET AL VS.
BORTHICK, ET AL
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MEMORANDUM DECISION

DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
As to the defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, and
that portion thereof which seeks a ruling of this Court that
all obligations toward the plaintiffs were adhered to as a
matter of law by the defendants, this Court must similarly deny
such a request as was done in the plaintiffs' Motion for Summary
Judgment, there being substantial and material questions of fact
remaining for determination.
Dealing with that portion of the defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment asserting the defense of governmental immunity,
the Court is compelled to reach a substantially different result.
Based upon the case authority cited by the defendants, including
the Utah Supreme Court language in Madsen vs. Borthick,
656 P.2d 627 (Utah 1983), supervision of a financial institution,
as was the situation here, constitutes a governmental activity.
Accordingly, unless the governmental immunity statute waives
governmental immunity, the action must be dismissed.

Under the

laws of this state, governmental immunity has been waived for
negligent acts and/or omissions of state employees, unless
the conduct falls into those specific exceptions listed in
Section 63-30-10 of the Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended.
Addressing the question as to whether or not the alleged conduct
of the defendants falls into the exceptions where governmental
immunity is not waived under the subparts of Section 63-30-10,

HILTON, £T AL VS.
BORTHICK, E^T AL
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MEMORANDUM DECISION

this Court finds that the defendants' arguments are persuasive.
The claims asserted against the defendants arise out of acts or
omissions that fall into the exceptions listed in Section 63-30-10.
The nature of defendant Borthick's actions or claimed failure
to act, even if such were proven, are discretionary, and
do not fall into a class of activities where governmental
immunity has been waived.

The alleged misrepresentations of the

defendants are not waived under Section 63-30-10.

The alleged

errors of the defendants in issuing or revoking licenses
are also not waived under Section 63-30-10.

The foregoing,

coupled with the policy reasons enumerated by the Supreme Court
for not imposing liability on public officials who perform
discretionary functions in good faith, leads this Court to the
conclusion that that portion of the defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment asserting the defense of governmental immunity
is well taken and should be the finding of this Court in this
case.

It follows that as no claim against the state can be

maintained, there therefore c.an be no claim against Commissioner
Borthick.

Plaintiffs1 claims against the defendants are

therefore dismissed on the basis of governmental immunity.
Counsel for the defendants is to prepare an appropriate
Order in conformance with this Memorandum Decision, and submit

HILTON, ET AL VS.
BORTHICK, ET AL
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the same to the Court for review and signature pursuant to
Rule 2.9 of the Rules of Practice for the District and Circuit
Courts of the State of Utah.
Dated this

^Mt? day of April, 1984.

\5\
TIMOTHY R. HANSON
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

EXHIBIT E

KESLER & Rl^2*
Attorneys .
Plaintiff and the Class
2000 Beneficial Life Tower
36 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 355-9333
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

MATTHEW FENI1 HILTON, et al.,
plaintiffs,
v.
MIRVIN D. BORTHICK, et al.,
Defendants.

:
:
:
:
:

ORDER
Civil No. C82-3798
C82-5165
(Consolidated)

:

On September 13, 1982, this Court filed its order
determining that this action shall be maintained as a class
action under Rule 23, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, by the
plaintiff Matthew Fenn Hilton for himself and as the
representative party for the class which was defined in that
order.

The plaintiff having prepared a notice of class

certification, the form and content of which have been
stipulated to by counsel for all parties.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1.

The above-entitled action shall be maintained as

a class action under Rule 23(b)(3), Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.
2.

The class shall consist of all individuals who

had deposited money or purchased debentures in Grove Finance
Company on July 18, 1980, excepting those whose rights have
been previously judicially determined.
3.

The form of notice attached hereto is the best

members

the class consisting of a.

individuals who had

deposited money or purchased debentures in Grove Finance
Company on July 18, 1980, except those whose rights have
previously been judicially determined as defined in the order
determining that this class shall be maintained as a class
action and modified by this order.

It is in compliance with

Rule 23(c)(2), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
4.

On or before the

day of November, 1982,

the notice shall be sent by the plaintiffs to each member of
the class by first class mail.

If any class member, as define

in the order determining that this action shall be maintained
t

as a class action, is a party of record to this litigation,
service of this notice shall be made on counsel of record for
such class member.
5.

The plaintiff on or before the

day of

November, 1982 shall file with the clerk of the court a
certificate of service setting forth the names and addresses o:
all members of the class to whom the notice was sent.
6.

The plaintiffs on or before the

day of

December, 1982 shall file with the clerk of the court and make
available to defendants any request for exclusion from members
of the class received in response to said notice.
DATED this

day of October, 1982.
BY THE COURT:

M,
Phi/lip R. Fishier,
District Court Judge

EXHIBIT F

restitutions—Appointment, term, qualifications, salary, oath and bond.—
1) There shall be a state department of financial institutions which
hall have charge of the execution of the laws of this state relating to
ianks and other financial institutions subject to this title and relating to
he business conducted by each.
(2) The chief officer of the state department of financial institutions
hall be the commissioner of financial institutions who shall be appointed
>y the governor by and with the consent of the senate. He shall hold
>ffiee for the term of four years and until his successor is appointed and
lualified, but he shall be subject to removal at the pleasure of the governor.
(3) The commissioner of financial institutions shall be a resident of
his state and a citizen of the United States and shall have had sufficient
ixperience in banking in an executive or administrative capacity or as
in employee of a state or federal bank supervisory agency to demonstrate
lis qualifications and fitness to perform the duties of his office.
(4) The salary of the commissioner of financial institutions shall be
ixed by the governor in accordance with standards adopted by the departnent of finance, and in addition thereto he may be allowed actual travelng expenses necessarily incurred in attending to official business. He shall
qualify by taking the constitutional oath of office and by giving to the state
i bond in such amount and in such form as shall be prescribed by the deDartment of finance, conditioned for the faithful performance of his duties,
rhe premiums on such bond shall be paid by the state.

7-1-3. Biennial reports by commissioner.—The bank commissioner shall
make on or before the 1st day of October, biennially, a report to the governor, containing a copy of the last report furnished by each institution
under the supervision of the banking department and any other proceedings had or done by the department showing generally the condition of
tuny itemized upon proper vouchers and certified by the bank commissioner
to the board of examiners to be audited and allowed as other claims
against the state.

7-1-7. Institutions under banking department.—All banks, ail loan ana
trust corporations, all building and loan associations, all industrial loan
companies, all credit unions, all small loan businesses required to obtain
a license under any provision of law, and all bank service corporations
shall be under the supervision of the banking department, and shall be
subject to examination by the bank commissioner and the examiners.

7-1-8. Visitation and examination.—The bank commissioner, or an
caminer, shall visit and examine every bank, savings bank, every loan
ad trust corporation, every building and loan association, every industrial
•an company, every small loan business, and every co-operative bank, at
ast once in each year. At every such examination careful inquiry shall
2 made as to the condition and resources of the institution examined,
ie mode of conducting and managing its affairs, the official actions of
s directors and officers, the investment and disposition of its funds, the
jcurity afforded to members, if any, and to those by whom its engageLents are held, whether or not it is violating any of the provisions of law
.x.n.x^s w wiyviawn* or 10 tne Dusmess ot tne institution examined
hether or not it is complying with its articles of incorporation and
flaws, and as to such other matters as the

7-1-13. Removal of incompetent bank officers and employees.—If the
bank commissioner finds that any officer or employee of any institution
under the supervision of the banking department is dishonest, reckless or
incompetent, or fails to perform any duty of his office, he shall notify the
board of directors of such institution in writing of his objections to such
officer or employee, and said board shall within twenty days after receipt
of such notification meet and consider such objections, first giving notice
to the bank commissioner of the time and place of meeting. If the board
finds the objections well-founded, such officer or employee shall be immediately removed.

7-1-14. Directors to examine affairs of institution.—The bank commissioner may at any time, and at least once a year shall, require the board
of directors of every institution under the supervision of the banking
department to examine or cause to be examined fully the books, papers
and affairs of the institution of which they are directors, and particularly
the loans, discounts and overdrafts thereof, with a special purpose of
ascertaining the value and security thereof and of the collateral security, if
any, given in connection therewith, and to inquire into such other matters
as the bank commissioner or bank examiner may require, and to cause a
report thereof to be placed on file with the records of such institution,
which report shall be subject to examination by the bank commissioner or
examiner.

7-1-17. Reports — Number per year — Publication — Fees.—The bank
commissioner shall each year make not less than four calls for report of
condition upon each bank and trust company under the supervision of
the banking department. Such report shall be made according to the form
prescribed by the bank commissioner, and shall be verified by the oath or
affirmation of the president or cashier and attested by at least three
directors. A copy thereof duly certified by the bank commissioner shall
De published by the institution making the same in some newspaper having general circulation in the county where the institution is situated,
and proof of such publication shall be filed in the office of the bank
commissioner within thirty days from the time of the receipt by the
institution of the copy certified by the bank commissioner. The fee for
filing and certifying each such report shall be $5.

7-1-18. Calls for special reports.—The bank commissioner shall have
power to call for special reports from any institution under the supervision of the banking department whenever in his judgment the same
may be necessary.

7-1-26. Articles of incorporation—Approval DJ pans, wmmnsumcx—
Procedure on application—Judicial review of act, decision or ruling of commissioner—Revocation for failure to activate business—Resale of charter,
license or permit prohibited.—(1) The bank commissioner shall have discretionary power in the approval of articles of incorporation of institutions subject to the supervision of the banking department and applications
for licenses to transact in this state any business subject to such supervision,
and may refuse to grant his approval when the plan of operation does not
comply with the laws of this state governing such institution or business,
or with accepted and prevailing practices, or when the incorporators or
organizers or any of them shall not be of such character, responsibility and
general fitness as to warrant the belief that the business will be honestly
conducted in accordance with law and for the best interests of the members,
customers and depositors of the institution, or when the location or field of
operation of the proposed business shall be in such close proximity to an
established business subject to this title that such established business
might be unreasonably interfered with and the support of the new business
would be such as to make improbable its success, or when other good and
sufficient reasons exist for such refusal.
(2) An application for approval of articles of incorporation of a bank,
loan and trust company or industrial loan corporation shall be set forth
in such form and contain such information as the bank commissioner may
reasonably require. Upon receipt of an application and not less than thirty
days before acting on an application, the bank commissioner shall give
notice thereof by publication in three successive issues in a newspaper of
general circulation in the county in which the principal place of business
is to be established. Any interested person may file a written protest to the
granting of such application stating the grounds therefor. The bank commissioner may, at his discretion, hold a public hearing on any application
whether or not a protest is filed. Any application not acted upon within
six months from the date of filing shall be deemed denied, and the bank
commissioner shall thereupon issue a written decision denying the application.

(3) The decision of the bank commissioner granting or denying an
application shall be in writing and state the reasons therefor. A copy of
the decision shall be mailed by the bank commissioner to the applicant and
all protestants. The bank commissioner may impose such reasonable conditions on the granting of an application as he deems necessary for the
public welfare and to carry out the purposes of this act.
(4) Any applicant for an approval of articles of incorporation, a permit
to establish a branch, or a license to transact any business subject to the
supervision of the banking department or any protestant to such application, feeling aggrieved by the act, decision or ruling of the bank commissioner with respect thereto, shall be entitled to judicial review thereof
by filing, within thirty days after the decision or ruling of the bank commissioner is issued, any applicable form of action (including actions for
declaratory judgment or writs of prohibitory or mandatory injunction),
in the district court of the district in which the office of the bank commissioner is located. The reviewing court shall have power to hold unlawful and set aside any act, decision or ruling of the bank commissioner
found to be arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not
in accordance with law.
(5) Any approval by the bank commissioner of articles of incorporation, a license to conduct business or an application to establish a
branch shall be deemed revoked unless the business so authorized is open
and operating within one year of the date of such approval, except that
the bank commissioner, on written application made before the expiration
of such period and for good cause shown, may extend the date for activation for additional periods not to exceed six months each.
(6) It shall be unlawful to obtain, for the purpose of resale, a charter,
license or permit to operate any bank or other financial institution under the
supervision of the banking department. The charter, license or permit may
be deemed revoked and the bank commissioner may take possession of the
business and property of any bank of other financial institution under his
supervision as provided in chapter 2 of this title, if, within a period of five
years after the approval of the articles of incorporation or the granting

»f a license or permit to do business by the bank commissioner, the assets
>r the license to do business or more than 49 per cent of the authorized
apital stock of such bank or other financial institution is sold or exchanged,
>r if, within such period, such bank or other financial institution merges or
onsolidates with another bank or other financial institution, unless the
>ank or other financial institution involved shall establish upon written
ipplication to the bank commissioner and by the clear preponderance of
he evidence, that its charter, license or permit was not obtained for the
rarpose of resale or that such sale, exchange, merger or consolidation is
lecessary to protect depositors or prevent failure.

7-*-*ii. tuiugit wuipuiauons—commissioner may revoKe certificate.—
^he bank commissioner may for cause at any time revoke the certificate
if approval and authorization of any foreign corporation authorized to
ransact any business in this state and subject to the supervision of the
tanking department.

islaturefindsthat it is in the public interest to strengthen the regulation,
supervision, and examination of persons,firms,corporations, associations,
and other business entities furnishing financial services to the people of
this state or owning and controlling those businesses. The legislature furtherfindsthat there have been substantial changes in the structure of the
financial services industry and the nature and characteristics of the institutions and other business entities furnishing those services. Accordingly,
it is the purpose of this act to expand and strengthen the duties, powers,
and responsibilities of the state department offinancialinstitutions and
to place under its jurisdiction all classes of institutions and other businesses engaged in furnishingfinancialservices to the people of this state
or owning and controlling those businesses. The legislature further finds
that there has been a trend toward the expansion of the powers and functions of federally chartered or insuredfinancialinstitutions to the competitive disadvantage of institutions chartered under the laws of this state.
Accordingly, it is the further purpose of this act to grant powers, privileges, and immunities to state chartered institutions at least equal to those
possessed by federally chartered or insured institutions of the same class
furnishingfinancialservices to the people of this state in order to nromote
competitive equality in thefinancialservices industry in this state and to
protect the interests of shareholders, members, depositor^Tald other ait
tomers of state chartered institutions.
|
The legislature further finds that the commissioner offinancialinstitu
tions under section 5 of chapter 4, Laws of Utah 1980, L s r^mmendfd
in order to protect the depositors, customers, and sha eholde^fdepost
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It is the further purpose of this act to implement thefindingsand recommendations of the commissioner in this report
It is the intent of the legislature that the provisions of this act be interpreted and implemented to promote those purposes.

7-1 -501. Powers and duties of commissioner as to financial institutions — Rules and regulations to be promulgated. In. addition to the
powers, duties, and responsibilities specified elsewhere in this title, the
commissioner shall have all the functions, powers, duties, and
responsiblities with respect to institutions, persons, or businesses subject
to the jurisdiction of the department contained in article 3.
The commissioner shall adopt and issue rules and regulations which
shall be consistent with the purposes and provisions of this title, and may
revise, amend, or repeal the same:
(1) To govern the administration and operation of the department of
financial institutions;
(2) To supervise the conduct, operation, or management of depository
institutions subject to the jurisdiction of the department and the examination, statements, and reports thereof;
(3) To authorize state chartered depository institutions to engage in
any activity, or to grant to those institutions additional rights, powers,
privileges, benefits, or immunities, which they could engage in or which
they would possess were they chartered under the laws of the United
States. In granting this authority the commissioner shall consider the following:
(a) The need for competitive equality between state chartered and federally chartered institutions;
(b) The adverse effect on shareholders, members, depositors, and other
customers of state chartered financial institutions if equal protection of
those institutions with federally chartered institutions of the same class
is not promptly available;
(c) Whether the circumstances are such that awaiting action by the legislature would unduly prejudice state chartered institutions, their shareholders, members, depositors, and other customers or adversely affect the
public interest
(4) To safeguard the interest of shareholders, members, depositors, and
other customers of institutions and other persons subject to the jurisdiction of the department;
(5) To establish the criteria to be applied in granting applications for
approval of new institutions, branches, relocation, merger, and consolidations, and changes in the control of institutions subject to the jurisdiction
of the department The criteria shall be consistent with the provisions of
this title and shall require as minimum for approval of any such application:
(a) Except as provided in chapter 9 with respect to credit unions, a
showing that no properly managed and soundly operated existing institu-
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operated after approval and implementation of the matters covered in the
application or the order of the commissioner, and
(c) A showing that the public interest will be promoted by the approval
of the application.
The criteria established under subsection (5) shall not be applied so as
to make it more difficult for a state chartered institution to obtain
approval of any such application than for a federally chartered institution
in the same class to obtain approval from the appropriate federal regulatory agency or administrator.
(6) To protect the privacy of the records of any institution subject to
the jurisdiction of the department pertaining to a particular depositor or
other customer of the institution. Rules and regulations promulgated under
this paragraph shall be consistent with federal laws and regulations applicable to the institution. Any institution required to produce records pursuant to a subpoena or other order of a court of competent jurisdiction shall
be reimbursed for the cost of retrieval and reproduction of the records by
the person seeking their production;
(7) To classify all records kept by institutions subject to the jurisdiction of the department and to prescribe the period for which records of
each class shall be retained. Regulations promulgated under this paragraph for any class of financial institution shall be consistent with federal
laws and regulations applicable to that same class of financial institutions
and shall take into consideration:
(a) Actions at law and administrative proceedings in which the production of the records might be necessary or desirable;
(b) State and federal statutes of limitations applicable to the action oi
proceedings;
(c) The availability, from other sources, of information contained in
these records; and
(d) Such other matters as the commissioner may consider pertinent in
formulating regulations which require institutions to retain their records
for as short a period as commensurate with the interest of customers,
members, depositors, and shareholders of the institutions and of the people
of this state in having the records available.
Regulations promulgated under this subsection (7) shall provide that any
institution may dispose of any record which has been retained for the
period prescribed by the commissioner for retention of records of its class
and shall thereafter be under no duty to produce those records in any
action or Droceedincr and shall incur no Habilitv to anv nerann bv reafton

may cause any and all records at any time in its custody to be reproduced
by the micro-photographic or other equivalent process. Any such reproduction shall have the same force and effect as the original and shall be
admissible into evidence as if it were the original
(8) To establish reasonable classes of depository and other financial
institutions including, in any event, separate classes for savings and loan
associations and related institutions, banks and related institutions, credit
unions, and thrift institutions, and to establish the following for each class
in a manner consistent with the purposes and provisions of this title:
(a) Eligible classes or types of investments for the deposits and other
funds of those institutions;
(b) Minimum standards for the capital and surplus required to engage
in the businesses conducted by each class or to establish a branch or additional office of an institution of each class. Within each class minimum
standards shall be uniform. The minimum standards shall be in amountsufficient to protect depositors and other customers of the institutions, taking into consideration any reserve requirements applicable to each class
of financial institutions;
(c) Eligible assets for the computation of capital and surplus and regulations prescribing or authorizing the use of subordinated notes or debentures and determining the extent to which they may be used for the
purpose of determining capital or when they are to be regarded as debt
for any purpose under this title;
(d) Uniform reserve requirements for institutions within each class.
These reserve requirements shall be uniform for all classes of institutions
with respect to transaction accounts;
(e) limitations on borrowings by each class of institution in relation
to the adequacy of its capital accounts, the character and condition of its
assets and its deposits and other liabilities;
(f) Limitations on the amount and nature of loans to any person or
related persons in relation to the capital and surplus.
Except with respect to reserve requirements on transaction accounts as
provided in subsection (8) (d), no restrictions or requirements imposed
under this subsection (8) shall be more stringent than those required under
federal laws or regulations for federally chartered institutions of the same
type or class.
(9) To authorize financial institutions engaged in making loans secured
by an interest in real estate to use such forms of trust deeds, mortgages,
or other instruments creating a security interest in real estate as are
approved or authorized by the comptroller of the currency, the board oi
crovernors of the federal reserve system, the federal deposit insurance cor» i i . - <-j^„«,i « . n i n m and ln&E

tion, the federal home loan mortgage corporation, the veterans administration, the department of housing and urban development, or any other
federal agency or instrumentality supervising or insuring depository institutions or providing a secondary market for loans secured by an interest
in real estate;
(10) To define unfair trade practices of persons subject to the jurisdiction of the department and prohibiting or restricting such practices;
(11) To establish reasonable standards to ensure the fair and truthful
advertising of (a) services offered by afinancialinstitution, (b) the charges
for such services, (c) the interest or other compensation to be paid on
deposits or any debt instrument offered for sale by the institution, and (d)
the nature and extent of any insurance on deposits, savings, or share
accounts, thrift certificates of deposit, thrift savings accounts, NOW
accounts, share draft accounts, transaction accounts, or any evidence of
indebtedness issued, offered for sale, offered to sell or sold by any person
subject to the jurisdiction of the department;
(12) To define what shall constitute an impairment of capital for each
class offinancialinstitutions under his jurisdiction;
(13) To designate holidays as defined in section 63-13-2 on which depository institutions shall be closed for the payment of checks, drafts, orders,
or other instruments drawn on transaction accounts;
(14) To regulate the issuance, offer to sell, offer for sale or sale of a
security or the advertising thereof to the extent authorized by section
7-1-503;
(15) To require the officers of any institution or other person subject
to his jurisdiction to open and keep a standard set of books or computer
records or both, for the purpose of keeping accurate and convenient records
sf the transactions and accounts of the institution in such a manner as
bo enable the commissioner, supervisors, and department examiners to
readily ascertain its true condition. These requirements shall be in keeping
pith generally accepted accounting procedures forfinancialinstitutions.

7-2-1. When commissioner may take possession.—The bank commissioner may forthwith take possession of the business and property of any institution under his supervision whenever it shall appear that such institution:
(1) Has violated its articles of incorporation or any law applicable
thereto;
(2) Is conducting its business in an unauthorized or unsafe manner,
or is practicing deception upon its members or the public, or is pursuing
a plan which is injurious to its members;
(3) Is not in sound and safe condition to transact its business;
(4) Has had an impairment of its capital for a period of ninety days;
(5) Has refused to pay its depositors in accordance with the terms
on which the deposits were received, or has become otherwise insolvent;
(6) Has neglected or refused to comply with the terms of a duly and
legally authorized order issued by the bank commissioner;
(7) Has refused, upon proper demand, to submit its records and affairs
for inspection to an examiner of the banking department; or,
(8) Whenever it shall appear that its officers have refused to be
examined under oath regarding its affairs.
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shall have the following meanings unless the content clearly requires a
different meaning. The meaning ascribed to the singular form shall apply
also to the pluraL
"Person" shall include individuals, copartnerships, associations, trusts,
corporations, and any other legal entities.
"License" shall mean a license, issued under the authority of this act,
to make loans in accordance with the provisions of this act at a single
place of business.
"Licensee" shall mean a person to whom one or more licenses have
been issued.
"Commissioner" shall mean the bank commissioner of Utah.
"Department" shall mean the state banking department of Utah.
"Interested party" as used in section 7-10-19, shall mean and include the
applicant for a license and any licensee having a place of business in the
community where the applicant proposes to do business, or any person who
has ap rvoarp ' 1 flf f h p hearincr or Droceeding before the department.

63-30-4. Act provisions not construed as admission or denial of liability
—•Effect of waiver of immunity—Exclusive remedy—Joinder of employee—
Limitations on personal liability.—Nothing contained in this act, unless
specifically provided, is to be construed as an admission or denial of liability or responsibility in so far as governmental entities are concerned.
Wherein immunity from suit is waived by this act, consent to be sued is
granted and liability of the entity shall be determined as if the entity were
a private person.
The remedy against a governmental entity or its employee for an injury
caused by an act or omission which occurs during the performance of such
employee's duties, within the scope of employment, or under color of
authority is, after the effective date of this act, exclusive of any other civil
action or proceeding by reason of the same subject matter against the
employee or the estate of the employee whose act or omission gave rise to
the claim, unless the employee acted or failed to act through gross negligence, fraud, or malice.
An employee may be joined in an action against a governmental entity
in a representative capacity if the act or omission complained of is one for
which the governmental entity may be liable, but no employee shall be held
personally liable for acts or omissions occurring during the performance
of the employee's duties, within the scope of employment or under color
of authority, unless it is established that the employee acted or failed to act
due to gross negligence, fraud or malice.

70B-1-102. Purposes—Rules of construction.—(1) This act shall be
liberally construed and applied to promote its underlying purposes and
policies.
(2) The underlying purposes and policies of this act are:
(a) to simplify, clarify and modernize the law governing retail installment sales, consumer credit, small loans and usury;
(b) to provide rate ceilings to assure an adequate supply of credit
to consumers;
(c) to further consumer understanding of the terms of credit transactions and to foster competition among suppliers of consumer
credit so that consumers may obtain credit at reasonable cost;
(d) to protect consumer buyers, lessees, and borrowers against unfair
practices by some suppliers of consumer credit, having due regard
for the interests of legitimate and scrupulous creditors;
(e) to permit and encourage the development of fair and economically
sound credit practices;
(f) to conform the regulation of consumer credit transactions to
the policies of the Federal Consumer Credit Protection Act [Act
of May 29, 1968, P.L. 90-321, 82 Stat 146, 15 TJ.S.C. §§ 1601 to
1677; 18 XJJS.C. §§891 to 896]; and
(g) to make uniform the law, including administrative rules, among
the various jurisdictions.
(3) A reference to a requirement imposed by this act includes reference
to a related rule of the administrator adopted pursuant to this act

70B-3-503. License to make supervised loans.—(1) The administrator
shall receive and act on all applications for licenses to make supervised
loans under this act. Applications shall be filed in the manner prescribed
by the administrator and shall contain the information the administrator
requires by rule to make an evaluation of the financial responsibility, character and fitness of the applicant.
(2) No license shall be issued unless the administrator, upon investiga.
tion, finds that the financial responsibility, character and fitness of the
applicant, and of the members thereof (if the applicant is a copartnership
or association) and of the officers and directors thereof (if the applicant
is a corporation), are such as to warrant belief that the business will be
operated honestly and fairly within the purposes of this act.
(3) Upon written request, the applicant is entitled to a hearing on the
question of his qualifications for a license if
(a) the administrator has notified the applicant in writing that hii
application has been denied, or
(b) the administrator has not issued a license within sixty days aftei
the application for the license was filed. A request for a hearing
may not be made more than fifteen days after the administratoi
has mailed a writing to the applicant notifying him that the
application has been denied and stating in substance the administrator's findings suDDorting denial of the application.

70B-3-504. Eevocation or suspension of license.—(1) The administrator may issue to a person licensed to make supervised loans an order to
show cause why his license should not be revoked or suspended for a period
not in excess of six months. The order shall state the place for a hearing
and set a time for the hearing that is no less than ten days from the date
of the order. After the hearing the administrator shall revoke or suspend
the license if he finds that:
(a) the licensee has repeatedly and willfully violated this act or any
rule or order lawfully made pursuant to this act; or
(b) facts or conditions exist which would clearly have justified the
administrator in refusing to grant a license had these facts or
conditions been known to exist at the time the application for
the license was made.
(2) No revocation or suspension of a license is lawful unless prior to
institution of proceedings by the administrator notice is given to the
licensee of the facts or conduct which warrant the intended action, and
the licensee is given an opportunity to show compliance with all lawful
requirements for retention of the license.
(3) If the administrator finds that probable cause for revocation of a
license exists and that enforcement of this act requires immediate suspension of the license pending investigation, he may, after a hearing upon five
days' written notice, enter an order suspending the license for not more
than thirty days.
(4) Whenever the administrator revokes or suspends a license, he
shall enter an order to that effect and forthwith notify the licensee of the
revocation or suspension. Within five days after the entry of the order
he shall deliver to the licensee a copy of the order and the findings supporting the order.
(5) Any person holding a license to make supervised loans may reinquish the license by notifying the administrator in writing of its relinluishment, but this relinquishment shall not affect his liability for acts
>reviously committed.
(6) No revocation, suspension, or relinquishment of a license shall
mpair or affect the' obligation of any pre-existing lawful contract between
he licensee and any debtor.
(7) The administrator may reinstate a license, terminate & suspension,
r grant a new license to a person whose license has been revoked or
ispended if no fact or condition then exists which clearly would have
istified the administrator in refusing to grant a license.

70B-3-506. Examinations and investigations.—(1) The administrator
shall examine periodically at intervals he deems appropriate the loans,
business, and records of every licensee. In addition, for the purpose
of discovering violations of this act or securing information lawfully required, the administrator or the official or agency to whose supervision
the organization is subject (section 70B-6-105) may at any time investigate
the loans, business, and records of any regulated lender. For these purposes
he shall have free and reasonable access to the offices, places of business,
and records of the lender.
(2) If the lender's records are located outside this state, the lender
at his option shall make them available to the administrator at a convenient
location within this state, or pay the reasonable and necessary expenses
for the administrator or his representative to examine them at the place
where they are maintained. The administrator may designate representatives, including comparable officials of the state in which the records are
located, to inspect them on his behalf.
(3) For the purposes of this section, the administrator may administer oaths or affirmations, and upon his own motion or upon request
of any party may subpoena witnesses, compel their attendance, adduce
evidence, and require the production of any matter which is relevant to the
investigation, including the existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and location of any books, documents, or other tangible things
and the identity and location of persons having knowledge or relevant
facts, or any other matter reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery
of admissible evidence.
(4) Upon failure without lawful excuse to obey a subpoena or to give
testimony and upon reasonable notice to all persons affected thereby, the
administrator may apply to the district court where his offices are located
for an order compelling compliance.

tions—Reliance on rules—Duty to report.—(1) In addition to other powers
granted by this act, the administrator within the limitations provided
by law may:
(a) receive and act on complaints, take action designed to obtain
voluntary compliance with this act, or commence proceedings
on his own initiative;
(b) counsel persons and groups on their rights and duties under
this act;
(c) establish programs for the education of consumers with respect
to credit practices and problems;
(d) make studies' appropriate to effectuate the purposes and policies
of this act and make the results available to the public;
(e) adopt, amend, and repeal substantive rules when specifically authorized by this act, and adopt, amend, and repeal procedural
rules to carry out the provisions of this act;
(f) maintain offices within this state; and
(g) employ any necessary hearing examiners, clerks, and other employees and agents.
(2) The administrator shall adopt rules not "inconsistent with the
Federal Consumer Credit Protection Act to assure a meaningful disclosure
of credit terms so that a prospective debtor will be able to compare
more readily the various credit terms available to him and to avoid the
uninformed use of credit. These rules may supersede any provisions of this
act which are inconsistent with the Federal Credit Protection Act if the
administrator finds such an inconsistency to exist and declares that the
purpose of superseding this act is to resolve this inconsistency and may
require disclosure by persons who arrange for the extension of credit, may
contain classifications, differentiations, or other provisions, and may provide
for adjustments and exceptions for any class of transactions subject to
this act which in the judgment of the administrator are necessary or proper
to effectuate the purposes or to prevent circumvention or evasion of, or to
facilitate compliance with, the provisions of this act relating to disclosure
of credit terms.
(3) To keep the administrator's rules in harmony with the Federal
Consumer Credit Protection Act and the regulations prescribed from
time to time pursuant to that act by the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System and with the rules of administrators in other
jurisdictions which enact the Uniform Consumer Credit Code, the administrator, so far as is consistent with the purposes, policies and provisions
of this act, shall :
(a)

before adopting, amending, and repealing rules, advise and consult
with administrators in other jurisdictions which enact the Uniform Consumer Credit Code; and
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the Federal Reserve System; and
(ii) the rules of administrators in other jurisdictions which enact
the Uniform Consumer Credit Code.
(4) Except for refund of an excess charge, no liability is imposed
under this act for an act done or omitted in conformity with a rule of the
administrator notwithstanding, that after the act or omission the rule
may be amended or repealed or beydetermined by judicial or other authority to be invalid for any reason.
(5) The administrator shall report to the governor and legislature on
the operation of his office, on the use of credit in the state, and on the
problems of persons of small means obtaining credit from persons regularly
engaged in extending sales or loan credit. For the purpose of making the
report, the administrator is authorized to conduct research and make appropriate studies. The report shall include a description of the examination
and investigation procedures and policies of his office, a statement of policies
followed in deciding whether to investigate or examine the offices of credit
suppliers subject to this act, a statement of the number and percentages of
offices which are periodically investigated or examined, a statement of the
types of consumer credit problems of both creditors and debtors which
have come to his attention through his examinations and investigations and
the disposition of them under existing law, a statement of the extent to
which the rules of the administrator pursuant to this act are not in harmony
with the regulations prescribed by the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System pursuant to the Federal Consumer Credit Protection Act
or the rules of administrators in other jurisdictions which enact the Uniform Consumer Credit Code and the reasons for such variations, and a
general statement of the activities of his office and of others to promote the
purposes of this act. The report shall not identify the creditors against
whom action is taken by the administrator.

70B-6-109. Assurance of discontinuance.—If it is claimed that a person
has engaged in conduct subject to an order by the administrator (section
70B-6-108) or by a court (sections 70B-6-110 through 70B-6-112), the
administrator may accept an assurance in writing that the person will not
engage in the conduct in the future. If a person giving an assurance of
discontinuance fails to comply with its terms, the assurance is evidence
that prior to the assurance he engaged in the conduct described in the
assurance.

70B-6-110. Injunctions against violations of act.—The administrator
may bring a civil action to restrain a person from violating this act and
for other appropriate relief-

78-2-2. Supreme Court jurisdiction.
(1) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to answer questions of
state law certified by a court of the United States.
(2) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary
writs and authority to issue all writs and process necessary to carry into effect
its orders, judgments, and decrees or in aid of its jurisdiction.
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of
interlocutory appeals, over:
(a) a judgment of the Court of Appeals;
(b) cases certified to the Supreme Court by the Court of Appeals prior
to final judgment by the Court of Appeals;
(c) discipline of lawyers;
(d) final orders of the Judicial Conduct Commission;
(e) final orders and decrees in formal adjudicative proceedings originating with:
(i) the Public Service Commission;
(ii) the State Tax Commission;
(iii) the Board of State Lands and Forestry;
(iv) the Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining; or
(v) the state engineer;
(f) final orders and decrees of the district court review of informal adjudicative proceedings of agencies under Subsection (e);
(g) a final judgment or decree of any court of record holding a statute of
the United States or this state unconstitutional on its face under the
Constitution of the United States or the Utah Constitution;
(h) interlocutory appealsfromany court of record involving a charge of
a first degree or capital felony;
(i) appeals from the district court involving a conviction of a first degree or capital felony; and
(j) orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of record over which the
Court of Appeals does not have original appellate iurisdiction.

78-12-25. Within four years.
Within four years:
(1) an action upon a contract, obligation or liability not founded upon
an instrument in writing; also on an open account for goods, wares and
merchandise, and for any article charged in a store account; also on an
open account for work, labor or services rendered, or materials furnished;
provided, that action in all of the foregoing cases may be commenced at
any time within four years after the last charge is made or the last
payment is received.
(2) an action for relief not otherwise provided for by law.
78-12-26. Within three years.—Within three years:
(1) An action for waste, or trespass upon or injury to real property;
provided, that when waste or trespass is committed by means of underground works upon any mining claim, the cause of action shall not be
deemed to have accrued until the discovery by the aggrieved party of the
facts constituting such waste or trespass.
(2) An action for taking, detaining or injuring personal property,
including actions for specific recovery thereof; provided, that in all cases
where the subject of the action is a domestic animal usually included in
the term 'livestock," having upon it at the time of its loss a recorded
mark or brand, if such animal had strayed or was stolen from the true
owner without his fault, the cause shall not be deemed to have accrued
until the owner has actual knowledge of such facts as would put a
reasonable man upon inquiry as to the possession thereof by the defendant.
(3) An action for relief on the ground of fraud or mistake; but the
cause of action in such case shall not be deemed to have accrued until
the discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts constituting the fraud
or mistake.
(4) An action for a liability created by the statutes of this state, other
than for a penalty or forfeiture under the laws of this state, except where
in special cases a different limitation is prescribed by the statutes of this
state.

78-12-28. Within two years.—Within two years:
(1) An action against a marshal, sheriff, constable or other officer upon
a liability incurred by the doing of an act in his official capacity, and in
virtue of his office, or by the omission of an official duty, including the
nonpayment of money collected upon an execution; but this section shall
noVapply to an action for an escape.
(2) An action to recover damages for the death of one caused by the
wrongful act or neglect of another.

78-12-29. Within one year.
Within one year:
(1) an action for liability created by the statutes of a foreign state.
(2) an action upon a statute for a penalty or forfeiture where the action
is given to an individual, or to an individual and the state, except when
the statute imposing it prescribes a different limitation.
(3) an action upon a statute, or upon an undertaking in a criminal
action, for a forfeiture or penalty to the state.
(4) an action for libel, slander, assault, battery, false imprisonment or
seduction.
(5) an action against a sheriff or other officer for the escape of a prisoner arrested or imprisoned upon either civil or criminal process.
(6) an action against a municipal corporation for damages or injuries to
property caused by a mob or riot.

EXHIBIT G

^^.^^V. V^£:&^
, j ,*>,'i y , i ^^TT

TV, i y, 'Vj'yl 1 ^ ( : : ^ r ^ T j ^ U ^ 7 " ' ^ ^

KJ?

1--W-VTM ';V/.:

?-r^g

PLEASANT GROVE FINANCE

COMPANY

mug*

10% CAPITAL DEBENTURE BOND

t^i

PLEASANT GROVE FINANCE

COMPANY, a Utah corporation (hcremalier sometimes called the

"Company") hereby acknowledges itself Indebted and (or value received promises to pay to

WESLEY R. or MAYBELLE F. DICKERSON

jt/wros
\

who resides at ^ 3

W e s t

7 Q 0

S o u t h

In the d y of

0 r e m >

U t a h

34357

State of Utah, in 60 months from date, the sum of

*TWENTY THOUSAND AND no/100 D O L L A R S * ^ ^ ^ ^ * * ^ ^ * * ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^

e

and to pay interest thereon at the rate of ten percent (10%) per year, payable or compounded quarterly on th€
31 st day of March. 30th day of June, 30th day of September and the 31 st day of December in each year, unti
maturity Both principal and interest are payable at or through the office of the Company m the City of Pleasan
Grove. Utah in any can or currency which at the time of payment may be legal tender lor public and private debts

mat
ittVvV

This Debenture is one of a duly authorized issue of debentures of the Company designated as its Series
10% Debentures, due in sixty (50) months from the dale of issue. -

••<M

This Debenture is subject to redemption before maturity at the option of the Company on any interest pa>
ment date. Tne redemption price shall be the principal amount plus accrued interest.
The Company and the Registrar may treat the record owner as actual and beneficial owner lor all purposes,
notwithstanding notice to the contrary. The debenture holder may transfer this debenture by surrender to the
Registrar of the debenture, properly endorsed, together with interest pass book, if any. and proper instructions
lor registering the new owners.
This Debenture has not been registered with any regulatory agency In the opinion of counsel. Us issuance
is exempt from registration The deoenture holder has. by his signature on the subscription agreement, warrantee
thai his purchase is "lor investment purposes'* and accepted all provisions thereol
Neither this Debenture nor the accrued interest hereon sholl become or be valid or obligatory for zrr)
purpose until this debenture is authenticated by the signatures of the Registrar and officers endorsed hereon
IN WITNESS WHEREOF. Pleasant Grove Finance Company has caused the signature of its president, arx
Its corporate seal to be hereunto affixed, attested by the signature of its secretary as of this

' day of

A o n ' 1 . 1980

1ST

in
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